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 Abstract 
Two of the ten priorities chosen by the 2014 European Commission were called “Energy 
Union and Climate” and “EU as a Global Actor”. While the Commission refers to these 
issues separately, this project aims to show the interlinkages between the two, arguing that 
the proposed Energy Union has a significant impact on the EU’s capabilities to emerge as a 
Global Actor. Three predominant readings (Great Power Europe, Civilian Power Europe and 
Normative Power Europe) on the EU’s Global Actorness are contrasted with the proposal and 
recent events on the EU energy security field. 
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1. Introduction 
“We are a global power, we just don’t know it yet.” 
- Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament 
(Die Zeit, 19 March 2015, No. 12, p. 8, own translation) 
 
It is hard to refer to Europe as merely a geographical continent as we then could 
misunderstand its broader spheres of existence and influence. Throughout the European 
history, people of the continent have been giving Europe a special character, sometimes as 
the sophisticated maiden Europa and in other instances as the ‘civilised’ centre of the world 
that has the right to colonise the rest of the globe. However, since the European superpowers 
lost their leading role in the world after the World Wars, European great nations have been in 
a search to find their place in the world. Striving for security and peace in the continent, 
European nation states formed a community that is now called the European Union (EU). 
Creating a common identity and shared goals between an ever- increasing numbers of 
member states has been a tremendous challenge to the EU throughout its entire history. So it 
is easy to agree with Isin & Saward when they state that Europe is both historically and 
geographically a very complicated project (Isin & Saward 2013:3). 
The EU in Global Polit ics 
When the Europe described above gives the home for the European Union (EU), it should not 
come as a surprise that the most elaborated political union in the world is multifaceted in 
nature. Ever since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 
the term ‘Europe’ has alleviated from a geographical notion to include spheres of 
economical, political, social, legal and even military integration. The integration has become 
more encompassing than many expected after the Second World War but nonetheless the EU 
has throughout its entire history struggled to find a foothold in a world heavily dominated by 
state sovereignty and nationally bound rights and cultures. As other regional state 
communities have not acquired the institutional and legal complexity of the EU, it is often 
compared to states. It is clear that some form of state has been seen as an example or even a 
goal for the EU and this has been directing the integration process further and further. The 
1993 signing of the Maastricht Treaty is a clear example of this. It introduced the EU 
citizenship that, although being submissive to national citizenship of the EU member states, 
furthered the integration of the EU to a more state- like entity. The effort to copy the state 
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terminology is not coincidental as the recognition of powerful actors in the international 
relations arena for a long time has been equivalent with that of statehood (Bretherton & 
Vogler 2006:15). One of the most difficult hurdles to overcome for the EU has been its lack 
of sovereignty in areas that project military power outside of the EU borders. Seeking more 
coherent external action was apparent in the creation of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the seat of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR/VP) in the Maastricht Treaty. These actions were strengthened by 
creating a more institutional setting for the EU foreign policy in the form of European 
External Action Service (EEAS) in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. These developments can, 
however, be seen also as shortcomings. The Lisbon Treaty was written after the Treaty 
establishing the Constitution for Europe was voted down in referendums in the Netherlands 
and France: a clear sign that even though the heads of member states were ready for 
constitutional frog leaping to state resemblance, the citizens of the EU were not. Despite the 
discouragement from their constituents, the leaders of the EU are still seeking to enhance its 
position in the international arena. This is most apparent in the statement of the president of 
the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, about the main objective for the EU: 
We need a stronger Europe when it comes to foreign policy. The Ukraine crisis 
and the worrying situation in the Middle East show how important it is that 
Europe is united externally. There is still a long way to go. (Juncker 2014:10) 
What are the implications of a “stronger Europe” that Juncker has in mind? “A Stronger 
Global Actor” is one of the ten priorities of Juncker’s Commission (EC homepage: 
Commission priorities). But what in turn is a Global Actor? The Commission seems to be 
confident that the EU is a Global Actor but does this hold true? Answering this question 
embarked us to write the project at hand.  
 
It is not only the EU officials who have pondered over the role of the EU in global politics. 
The academic discussion has developed numerous concepts to describe and frame the power 
the EU is exerting in global politics. Some of them have gained less adherence in academia, 
such as a “neo-medieval empire” (Zielonka 2006), an “European superpower” (McCormick 
2007), a “small power” (Toje 2010) or “middle power” (Laatikainen 2006). The three 
concepts that have attracted most of the academic attention are (1) a neorealist narrative 
denying the EU’s ability to become a relevant actor in global politics, which call Great Power 
Europe (GPE), (2) the concept of a Civilian Power Europe (CPE) arguing the EU exerts its 
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global influence through its economic and diplomatic power, and (3) a narrative focussing on 
the Union’s as a Normative Power Europe (NPE) intending to spread a specific set of values. 
It is our intention to contribute to the academic discourse about the EU as a Global Actor by 
applying the three predominant concepts to describe the European Union’s global influence 
on the field of energy policy and energy security. 
Energy as a Global Con cern 
The second main ingredient of this project is the matter of energy security. The term can be 
dissociated into energy on the one hand and security on the other. Energy is essential to 
modern societies, since modern transport systems, industrial product ivity, commercial 
activity, and daily life in general are all relying on a constant supply of energy. Currently, 
fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal) constitute the major sources of energy. It is a matter of 
fact that their global distribution is imbalanced: the main consumer countries are not 
necessarily the ones that have high fossil fuel reserves in place. China, the USA and the EU 
consume most of the global energy. However, the major producer countries for oil are Saudi 
Arabia, Russia and the USA, followed by the Gulf states; and for gas the USA, Russia and to 
a lesser extent Iran, Qatar, Norway, Canada (and others). Coal is more equally scattered over 
the globe but since its environmental effects are even more devastating than the ones 
connected with oil and gas its usage is avoided especially in Europe. While the USA are 
endowed with own oil and gas production to fuel its economy, China and the EU member 
states seem to rely on imports of fossil fuels to meet domestic demand.  
 
The dependency on fossil fuels compromises global security in two different ways. Firstly, 
the burning of fossil fuels creates environmental damage that endangers the habitability of the 
whole planet, or at least parts of it. Hence, using this ‘cheap’ source of energy can have 
immensely costly consequences. Secondly, as the fossil fuel resources inevitably run out, the 
world will see rises in energy prices and increased conflict between the actors that have 
access to energy resources and those that do not. As the EU belongs to the latter camp, the 
question of European energy security becomes very pressing. Consequently we are moving 
towards a future where global energy dynamics are very uncertain, as both long-term and 
short-sighted measures can distort the political arena of energy security.   
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Energy in the EU 
Energy has since the formation of ECSC lain at the heart of the European integration process, 
as the Treaty of Paris (1951) focussed on creating a common market for coal and steel in 
order to neutralise competition over natural resources. As former French foreign minister 
Robert Schuman states in 1950 in the proposal of the ECSC, the aim was to “make war not 
only unthinkable but materially impossible”. Moreover, the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) founded in 1957 was also mainly focussed on ensuring peaceful 
use of nuclear power. Energy issues lost their central role in the EC/EU policies over the 
years but this has changed rather recently. Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, 
member states and European Commission share competency on energy issues.. Thus the EU 
reclaimed part of its former focus on energy. The most recent development on the matter is 
the Energy Union initiative from 2015. Jean-Claude Juncker stated that energy and the 
formation of the Energy Union are at the core of the new Commission’s actions already in his 
opening statement to the European Parliament on 15 July 2014 (Juncker 2014). 
 
Interestingly enough, making the EU “a Stronger Global Actor” is also one of the top 
priorities of the new Commission (EC homepage: Commission priorities). The Commission 
sees these two issues as separate goals, but as we see it they are interlinked. Energy concerns 
being global in nature, any changes in the EU’s energy policies will have an effect in its 
capabilities as a Global Actor. Thus we arrive to our hypothesis: The EU has the potential to 
become a stronger global actor through the implementation of the Energy Union Package. 
Research Question and Structure of Project  
These considerations lead us to our research question and underlining working questions: 
 
How is the Energy Union transforming the EU as a Global Actor? 
 What constitutes a Global Actor?  
 How does the EU definition of energy security and developments in energy policies 
reflect different traits of Global Actorness? 
 What kind of expectations does the Energy Union proposal set for the EU? 
 How would fulfilling these expectations impact the EU as a Global Actor? 
 Would the Energy Union increase the power of the EU? If this is the case, what kind 
of power? 
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The project is structured as follows: in the Methodology chapter we will explain how we will 
conduct our study. As stated above, our study follows an inductive approach, and we are 
predominantly interested in how the EU defines energy security and most importantly, which 
dimensions of energy security are focal in their energy policies. This goes on to show what 
kind of developments these new energy policies would have on different readings of the EU 
as a global power. This chapter also gives a more detailed account on the sources that we 
have used in our research and delimitations that we have faced while conducting our study. 
 
The Theory chapter gives the reader an up-to-date review of theoretical discussion on the 
terms global actor and energy security. These theoretical tools are useful when painting a 
more overall picture of our topic. They give us the means to chart where the EU stands at the 
moment of writing and to which direction it might be heading.  
 
At the core of the project lies the Analysis and Discussion chapter. In the former we will 
carry out our research in the manner described in the previous chapters. In the latter we will 
discuss our findings and situate them in a historical and global context. In Summary and 
Concluding Remarks chapter we will summarise our project and outline our most important 
findings. We will also consider the possibilities for further research. 
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2. Methodology and Methods 
In the following chapter we will briefly outline the methodological approach that is guiding 
us through this project as well as describe the methods we chose to apply to this project. 
After this we will explain the data collection process and describe the main delimitations of 
the project. 
2.1. Methodology 
2.1.1. Critical Realism 
Critical Realism combines three methodologies to form a base for conducting research. 
Firstly, it acknowledges the possibility of causal relations. However, these are not simple 
cause-effect chains that are easily observable but instead occur in morphologically emergent 
reality; instead of being deterministic they are contingent. In other words the subject of social 
sciences is not a passive, stationary world but a dynamic reality where it is possible to explain 
changes through research. Secondly, critical realism accepts the hermeneutic nature of social 
reality. Reality is constructed by communicative actions and the actions of observer can 
influence the observed. However, according to Critical Realism reality exists independently 
of human consciousness. Thirdly, as the name suggests, critical realism involves a critical 
dimension (Delanty 2005:145–8). 
 
The ontological view of Critical Realism fits well with our perception of the EU as a Global 
Actor: the EU is constructed through communicative actions but it still exists o utside of 
researchers’ reasoning. Hence its identity and capabilities as a Global Actor can be 
objectified even though it is based on a social construction. According to Critical Realism 
reality must be understood as a correlation of three different dimensions: 
 
1. The empirical domain: what can be observed and experienced. 
2. The actual domain: the actions that actually take place whether or not they are 
experienced or observed. 
3. The real domain: where the underlying mechanisms can and must be understood. 
 
The underlying mechanisms has to be understood as part of a system of meaning that affect 
the real domain, but at the same time they are observed in the empirical domain as 
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fragmented elements (Hansen & Simonsen 2007:130). Thus we are able to understand the 
real domain through analysing the mechanisms apparent to us in the empirical domain. The 
analysis of these underlying mechanisms calls for the use of retroduction and abstraction. 
Retroduction and abstraction  
The concepts of abstraction and retroduction are very important when writing a project 
within critical realism. Abstraction on the one hand involves the process of isolating what is 
of importance. It revolves around “transcending the level of description and penetrate what 
reveals to be the surface of society [...] abstracting and in thought identifying the forces and 
generative mechanisms that are behind” (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2012:305). Abstraction 
becomes crucial when uncovering the relationship between elements of the empirical and the 
real domain.  
 
Retroduction on the other hand puts an emphasis to present underlying mechanisms so that a 
conclusion can be reached, instead of focusing on how this conclusion is reached. As Buch-
Hansen & Nielsen expresses it, “... the relations between the premise and the conclusion is 
turned upside down and by that the logic fade into the background” (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 
2012:304). This requires us moving back and forth between the empirical reality and our 
theoretical conception of it.  
2.1.2. Qualitative Case Study 
Critical realism has the advantage of being “compatible with a relatively wide range of 
research methods, but it implies that the particular choices should depend on the nature of the 
object of study and what one wants to learn about it” (Sayer 2000:19). A qualitative case 
study is our tool of choice in order to investigate the phenomenon (the case) at hand (which is 
in short EU actorness), since this approach is best suited for our research question. Yin 
(2003) recommends a case study, when (a) the research questions aims on explaining a 
phenomenon, (b) the behaviour of the involved parties is not influenced by the researcher, (c) 
the context is considered important or (d) context and phenomenon cannot offhand be 
separated (Yin 2003:9; see also Baxter & Jack 2008:545). Easton (2010) states that “[a] 
critical realist case approach is particularly well suited to relatively clearly bounded, but 
complex, phenomena such as organisations, interorganisational relationships or nets of 
connected organisations” (Easton 2010:123). Qualitative research enables us to cut the 
Gordian knot of complex factors and relationships between the EU’s Global Actorness and 
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energy policies, especially energy security. We are doing so by means of an iterative-parallel 
process, which “implies a continuous moving back and forth between the diverse stages of 
the research project” (Verschuren 2003:132). This means that we do not conduct a pre-
structured or linear-serial strategy, instead discoveries in a later stage of our project could 
very well affect previous findings and our progress is shaped by our findings (Ibid.). 
2.2. Methods 
The goal of this project is to find out how the proposal by the European Commission for an 
Energy Union transforms the EU as a Global Actor. Firstly, we need to bring clarity to the 
terms Global Actor and energy security. These are very important notions for the project 
since they form the basis for our inquiry. As they are rather complicated and multifaceted 
concepts, they are discussed in length in the Theory C hapter. Secondly, we need to form a 
link between the EU’s energy policies and its capabilities as a Global Actor. On the empirical 
domain we are only observing a new energy policy proposal for the EU. However, we 
suggest that the proposal has underlying mechanisms that form the actual domain, which then 
has an impact on the real domain where the EU’s capabilities as a Global Actor lie. This 
means that the three domains mentioned above would be as follows for this project: 
 
1. The empirical domain: the analysis of the Energy Union proposal 
2. The actual domain: the investigation of underlying mechanisms; the expectations that 
we derive from the Energy Union Proposal 
3. The real domain: reflections on how these expectations alter the EU’s Global 
Actorness 
In practice the link is made in this qualitative case study in a following way: we will analyse 
the Commission’s Energy Union Proposal in relation to its former energy policies and 
through the process of abstraction establish a set of expectations the Commission is hop ing 
for the EU to fulfill through its proposal. After deriving these expectations we will relate 
them to three dominant Global Actor readings: Military Power Europe, Civilian Power 
Europe and Normative Power Europe. In the analysis we apply a retroductive approach and 
are thus able to go back and forth between the expectations we derive from the Energy Union 
Proposal and the three different theoretical readings on Global Actorness in order to answer 
our research question and possibly verify our preliminary hypothesis. In addition we can 
relate these conceptions to recent EU actions on the energy field. 
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2.2.1. Data Collection 
The EU is remarkably transparent in its decision making process and most of the policy 
papers are readily available on the internet. Amongst the numerous EU policy papers we 
decided to focus on the ones related to energy security, starting from the year 1995 (EC 
1995a; b; 2000; 2003; 2006a; 2007; 2008a; b; 2010; 2014a; b; 2015a; b). In this regard, we 
are mainly focusing on documents drafted and published by the Commission, which is the 
executive body of the EU, but also draw on the European Council and the European 
Parliament documents. Interest in the energy topic have been increasing in the recent years, 
which explains why majority of our primary resources are written during this decade. The 
Energy Union Package from 25 February 2015  is the latest and in many ways a pivotal 
addition to the series of energy documents and this is why it is selected as the most focal 
document for our project.  
 
As our intention is to assess the EU as a Global Actor we have decided to leave national 
considerations of energy security out of our scope. According to TFEU, EU and member 
states share competencies in terms of energy issues (TFEU 2012: Article 4; s ee also Articles 
170 and 194). As the Commission is an institution that “represents the interests of the EU as a 
whole” (EC homepage: European Commission at work), its policy papers are a natural 
primary source when assessing the Global Actorness of the EU. This is even more 
highlighted with the current Commission since one of their ten priorities was to strengthen 
the EU as a Global Actor (EC homepage: Commission priorities).  
2.2.2. Delimitations 
The EU forms an immensely complex case study. It includes various institutions that all 
collectively give it its special characteristics. In order to give a coherent picture of the EU we 
decided to concentrate on the work of the Commission. As stated above, the Commission is 
the executive body of the EU and its members are bound to work keeping in mind the 
interests of the EU as a whole. Whilst it is not in the scope of this project to find out whether 
all the Commissioners work in this way in reality we have decided to assume that this is the 
case. Even after making this simplistic reduction into the Commission representing the EU, 
we are still faced with a complicated institution. The Commission comprises of 28 
Commissioners, one from each member state, and their opinions on the matter can vary. The 
duties of the Commission are divided into specific areas of expertise, thus the most relevant 
Commissioners for our project are Maroš Šefčovič, Commission Vice-President for Energy 
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Union and Miguel Arias Cañete, Commissioner of Climate Action and Energy. The Energy 
Union and its implementation is mainly on their responsibility. Comments and speeches from 
Jean-Claude Juncker are used too, since he is the current President of the European 
Commission.  
 
As it is the responsibility of the Commission to present other EU institutions all the 
initiatives, it is rather difficult to trace the real authorship of any policy proposals. In the 
majority of the cases, the initial idea for a proposal come from outside of the Commission 
(Bomberg et al. 2012:54). Moreover, the actual writing work of these documents takes place 
in Directorate-Generals (DGs) that are designed to serve the needs of the Commissioners. 
Hence all the DGs under the aforementioned Commissioners are included in the writing of 
the policy proposals and/or the actual implementation of policies in the EU. 
 
Because of the process of writing a policy proposal has multiple stages going from one DG to 
another and to the Commission and back before it is finalised, many interesting developments 
during the process can only be traced by interviewing people close to these various 
institutions. Taking into account the multidimensional nature of energy questions, it would 
have required extensive research and numerous interviews of staff in different DGs and the 
Commissioners or sources from their offices to get comprehensive picture of creation of the 
documents in question. Apart from being difficult to undertake, this task would have 
exceeded the scope of the project. However, we have tried to overcome this lack of inside 
input by making use of academic literature about energy policies and their creation and think 
tank reviews in the case of the Energy Union Package, it being so recent tha t no academic 
literature has been published about it. 
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3. Theory Chapter 
Our Theory Chapter is divided to three different sections: first we introduce the reader to 
three notions of the EU as a Global Actor, which is then followed by a discussion about 
Energy Security. In the last section of the Chapter we will connect the two different 
theoretical notions and explain why it is essential to do so for answering our research 
question. This chapter is not simply an outline of the theories we are going to apply on the 
issue but also a presentation of the state of the art. We will refer to the most recent discussion 
in academia and connect the EU Global Actorness in relations to energy security, which has 
been largely neglected in the academic literature and is consequently important to investigate. 
3.1. The EU as a Global Actor 
We will start our Theory Chapter by outlining the most predominant discussion about the EU 
as a Global Actor. The Global Actor literature in general can be seen as a response to the 
integration in Europe. As mentioned earlier, the three notions of Global Actorness we have 
chosen are Great Power Europe, Civilian Power Europe, and Normative Power Europe. As 
their name suggests, they do not settle for stating whether the EU is a Global Actor or not, 
but are also interested in how the EU can project power globally. Each of the theoretical 
approaches to Global Actorness are followed by a ‘state of the art’ discussion that outlines 
the main critiques to the approach in question. This is done to make sure that the use of the 
theory is not narrow sighted. The critiques will additionally be used to assess whether the EU 
in its developments in energy policy is actually silencing critical voices or not. We are aware 
that looking only into the theories that are closely interlinked to the EU and Europe can make 
our point of departure rather Eurocentric. However, many of the most useful theoretical 
notions are created with a special connection to the EU and are thus central for our project. 
3.1.1. Great Power Europe 
In order to conceptualise the term Global Actor, we need to start with the Treaty of 
Westphalia, which in 1648 formally introduced the modern state system and notion of the 
sovereign territorial state. In conventional IR, actors are those units constituting the 
international system, id est inter-state system (cf. Bull 1977; Donnelly 2006:145; Jackson 
2007:299). So how do neorealists describe the global role of the European Union? Does the 
EU have the necessary capability to be recognised as a great power in world affairs, a Great 
Power Europe? Of special interest to neorealist is the power o f states, which influences the 
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security of states in the international system. Consequently, the main concern to neorealists 
are the most powerful states, because power is the “currency of international relations” and 
consequently states attach high importance to their military but also economic power in 
relations to others (Mearsheimer 2010a:78). For neorealists power is just a means for the goal 
of security: “In anarchy, security is the highest end” (Waltz 1979:126). The security problem 
is structural because a relatively strong state might not intent to harm a weaker one but has 
the possibility to do so, which makes the latter fear the former. Since there is no higher 
authority that could guarantee the enduring existence of a state, the latter has to rely on its 
own power or alliances for security in this so called self-help world (Hyde-Price 2006:220-
221; Mearsheimer 2010a:78; Walt 1987; 1997). As a deductive theory, structural realism 
does not intend to describe reality but rather seeks to explain phenomena. It is, therefore, 
essential to simplify. Neorealism’s focus on the international level is not paying attention to 
the inner-state decision making process (for instance, whether a state is democratic or 
autocratic). According to the scientific literature, we can depict five assumptions of the 
neorealist theory (see for instance Mearsheimer 2010a:79–81; Smith, S. 2000:35; Waltz 
1979): 
 
1. First of all, neorealism assumes states are the main actors in an international system 
shaped by anarchy (Waltz 1979:88). This does not mean that world politics is in a 
constant state of chaos but that there is no authority above the states that could 
manage their relations. There are other actors, as for instance international 
organisation but their influence on global politics is limited and rather used as a forum 
for states to carry on their negotiations (Waltz 2000:18–19). 
2. The second assumption goes that states hold offensive military capabilities, which put 
them in the position to harm each other. States may be equal ac tors but they have 
various capabilities (Ibid.:88, 97–99; Mearsheimer 2010:80). 
3. The third assumption is the uncertainty of each other’s intentions. A state can never 
know whether other states strive for hegemony or are satisfied with the balance of 
power (Waltz 1979:102). This leads to a security dilemma: Whenever a state takes 
actions to improve its security situation, another state’s security situation will 
deteriorate relatively. 
4. This leads to the fourth assumption that the main objective of states is their survival in 
this international anarchical system. A state may have other goals but survival is 
always the priority. 
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5. The fifth assumption is that states base their behaviour and strategies on rational 
considerations. That does not mean, though, that states may act wrong in consequence 
of misjudged circumstances. 
Latent Power 
Generally, great powers face three main alternatives to achieve their security: balancing, 
bandwagoning, or buck passing (Hyde-Price 2006:224; Waltz 2000:38; 1979:126; Walt 1987; 
Mearsheimer 2001; 2010a:83). The most important instrument with respect to these strategies 
is military force. Nuclear weapons need special consideration due to their ability to ultimate 
destruction of the enemy. However, they are not very useful in a conflict between two nuclear 
powers because of their ability to retaliation (Mearsheimer 2010a:83). It is important to note 
that military capabilities are a very important factor for a state in order to gain security in the 
international system, but it is by far not the only one. Another noteworthy source of power 
can be so called latent power and includes socio-economic parameters that are precondition 
in order to assemble sufficient military capacity (Mearsheimer 2010a:78–9). For the purpose 
of this project, we consider a sustainable and efficient supply of energy an important latent 
power factor that is often neglected in the neorealist literature. 
State of the Art: A Great Power without Arms? 
We mentioned above that realism attributes little influence to international organisations in 
shaping the international relations as relevant actors. Not being a nation state, the EU was 
mostly neglected by neorealist studies, despite the fact that it is integral to the security system 
on the European continent; the EU seems to be a challenge for the neorealist theory (Collard-
Wexler 2006:398). Based on the assumption of neorealism that cooperation under bipolarity 
is more likely than under multipolarity (Waltz 1979:167–70), Hyde-Price (2006) gives an 
explanation from a realist perspective: The international system changed from a multipolar to 
a bipolar system in consequence of the Second World War. With the institutionalisation of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the United States created a security shield 
for the Western European countries, which put them in the position to cooperate without 
worrying about their safety. Conflicts, thus, could be solved peacefully under the provided 
security umbrella (Hyde-Price 2006:225). 
 
The end of the bipolar international system with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s made opponents of neorealism argue the theory is now outdated. Neorealists, 
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though, counter that by saying that a change in the system does not make the theory obsolete 
(Waltz 2000:3). Since the end of the Second World War, the major European powers 
engaged more and more in economic and societal integration (e.g. ECSC or EURATOM), 
which put them in the position to lose a lot and gain little in case of a military conflict. 
Furthermore, the major European powers are well aware of each others’ capabilities and 
sudden armament and mobilisation would certainly attract the others’ attention (Kluth & 
Pilegaard 2011:47). Other scholars see the main reason for absence of war between the main 
European powers in the enduring military presence of the United States on the continent after 
the Cold War. The Western European states do not provide for their own security but rely on 
the military security provided by the United States (Bull 1982:152; Mearsheimer 2010). In 
consequence, realist scholars argue that the EU (EC) cannot be an international actor as long 
as it lacks sufficient military capacity. With regard to the observation of the international 
system being in a transition period from unipolarity to multipolarity (Waltz 2000:32), it can 
be argued that the EU is already trying to balance against the United States being the military 
superior hegemon. The EU does so by building military capabilities to prevent the USA to 
use its power against Europe (Kluth & Pilegaard 2011:50). Consequently neorealist scholars 
reject the notions that the EU constitutes a real power through ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ 
instruments. Hedley Bull argues that the EU (EC) is only able to exert civilian power because 
it is situated in a “strategic environment provided by the military power of states”. In other 
words, as long as member states back the EU’s foreign policy with military capacity, it can 
act as a so called civilian power. Thus, according to Bull, the exertion of civilia n power by 
the EU is in itself not sufficient in defining it as an actual power (Bull 1982:151).  
 
However, even Kenneth Waltz, deceased chief whip of the neorealist camp, suggested the 
possibility of the EU becoming a great power (Waltz 1979:180; 2000:30). The EU’s 
remarkable economic integration not alone political unity is without predecessor in history. 
Waltz goes on that the EU “has all the tools – population, resources, technology, and military 
capabilities – but lacks the organizational ability and the collective will to use them” 
(Ibid.:31). In the end of the 20th century, Waltz assumed that the state of affairs will not alter 
unless the EU would create a platform to express its external affairs or Germany would opt 
for leading a coalition. According to Waltz, Europe has to claim a louder and a united voice 
to play a bigger role in alliance affairs. They need to achieve the same integration they 
developed in economic matters. In addition, French and Britons need to merge their nuclear 
weapons, which could be the “nucleus of a European military organization”. Waltz arrives at 
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the conclusion that until this happens “Europe will count for little in international politics” 
(Ibid.:32). The neorealist theory in general follows Waltz’s argument that European states 
have to further unite their political and economic power in order to be in a better position to 
enforce their interests (cf. Collard-Wexler 2006:424). 
 
Collard-Wexler challenges the neorealist reading and notes that the “EU constitutes an 
anomaly to neorealism” and that neorealism gives “a poor account of one of the most 
important processes of contemporary world politics” (Collard-Wexler 2006:399). For 
instance, Collard-Wexler argues that neorealism would have expected the East European 
countries after the Cold War to balance against the great power of the EU and the NATO 
(Ibid.:405). Collard-Wexler argues that the EU has challenged the neorealist assumption that 
nation states are the main actors in the international system: “[the EU is] an important actor, 
one that has broken the monopoly of the state in the management and governance of world 
affairs” (Ibid.:412), referring to the importance of the EU in trade negotiations, in being 
biggest donor in aid conferences, and having observer status at G8 summits. In 2006 the EU 
stood between being a state and an international organisation. Member states have an interest 
in maintaining this status of the EU, because it allows them to be recognized with one voice 
and at the same time maximise their influence through using nation state status in the 
international system (e.g. on international conferences). Against the notion of neorealism, the 
EU seems to prove that there can be different kinds of actors in the anarchical international 
system (Collard-Wexler 2006:413). Seeberg goes as far as to argue that the EU exploits its 
normative, soft power ‘aura’ in order to act in the sphere of hard power by stating that the EU 
is “acting as a realist actor in normative clothes” (Seeberg 2009:95). In the recent literature  it 
is argued that the EU is an actor “sui generis” but it lacks the external capabilities of nation 
states. Consequently, the academic debate should move beyond the state focused analysis of 
international relations in favour of recognising other global actors like regional organisations 
(Wunderlich 2012). A good example of this is Thomson’s article about EU’s and other non-
state actor’s impact on modern notion of sovereignty (Thomson 1995). 
3.1.2. Civilian Power Europe 
The concept of civilian power has its origin in the 1970’s when Duchêne presented the term 
in describing the European Economic Community (EEC). To him it was of great importance 
that the EEC remained “a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on 
armed forces” (Duchêne 1973:19), which goes to show what the term initially contained and 
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that the EU has largely been the source of inspiration for it. Non-military engagement in 
conflict situations lies at the core of civilian power, which is emphasised in the definition of 
civilian power by Hans Maull: 
the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of 
international objectives; the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, 
means to secure national interest goals, with military power left as a residual 
instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international 
interaction; and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address 
critical issues of international management (Maull 1990:92-3). 
The focus on the economic tools as a primary source in securing national interest lies at the 
core of civilian power but it is equally important to notice from this definition that military 
power is not left out of the equation; rather it has become marginalized to a role of 
safeguarding. This means that military power is not irrelevant to the notion of civilian power 
as it still plays a role in attaining goals. However, as Moravcsik argues in Newsweek (2002, 
17 June:23), in the case of the EU, the civilian power “does not lie in the deployment of 
battalions or bombers, but rather in the quiet promotion of democracy and development 
through trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping”. Moravcsik’s argument is in line with Hill’s 
notion that in the post-Cold War period the EC functions included stabilising Western 
Europe, managing world trade, providing the principal voice of the developed world in 
relations with the global South, and constituting a second voice of the west in international 
diplomacy (Hill 1993:310–1). This notion of the EU’s impact in international relations is 
very ‘civilian’ in nature and greatly relies on diplomacy and economic strength in balancing 
powers and upholding strong relations among states and people where there is an immediate 
divide.  
 
Multilateralism is also at the heart of CPE, as the advocates emphasise that the EU has played 
a pivotal role in the development, adoption and implementation of important multilateral 
legal instruments. The instruments referred to here are the Kyoto Protocol, the International 
Criminal Court and initiatives like the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention 
Verification Protocol and the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines 
(Keukeleire & MacNaughton 2008:302). Conclusively the bedrock of the EU’s civilian 
power is built on three aspects: 
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1. The economic power and attractiveness of the European single market to which 
partners can enjoy access and experience development through trade and aid. 
2. The power of diplomacy in peacekeeping and promotion of democracy through 
supranational structures. 
3. The emphasis on multilateralism as a key tenet. 
State of the Art: The Ambig uity of Militar ization and the Relative D ecre ase 
in Economic Strength 
A threat that some academics point to when talking of the EU as a civilian power is the 
increasing militarization of the Union. To some this entails that the term CPE starts to carry 
less relevance (Zielonka 1998). To this Karen Smith argues that: 
… the stated intention of enhancing the EU’s military resources carries a price: it 
sends a signal that military force is still useful and necessary, and that it should be 
used to further the EU’s interests. It would close off the path of fully embracing 
civilian power. And this means giving up far too much for far too little (Smith, K. 
2000:28). 
To Smith the enhancement of military capabilities of the EU means that the EU itself does 
not believe in the absolute power of civilian power as a substitute for the military capabilities 
of the great state powers. However, some are of the conviction that attaining military 
capabilities would only make the civilian argument stronger as it would then evolve from 
civilian power by default to civilian power by design (Stavridis 2001:50). In other words 
having the possibility of acting with military but choosing not to makes the civil ian power 
argument even stronger. Advocates of CPE thus point to the EU as a hybrid in nature in 
regard of foreign policy instruments when military capabilities become part of its 
instrumental arsenal. It merely becomes a secondary instrument and supplementary to the 
economic and diplomatic instruments, which the EU still relies on as its core strength (Larsen 
2002:292).  
 
An important argument in assessing the CPE is the EU’s relative power in regard of 
economic strength. The economic instrument lies at the heart of CPE and is also the 
‘gatekeeper’ of diplomatic solutions. This means that the relative economic strength of the 
EU has to be extensive in order for the EU to make its impact. Here Grimm argues that since 
the 1980’s the EU has gradually been losing its share of world trade as developing countries, 
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especially from the parts of East and Southeast Asia, have gained prominence (Grimm 
2010:45). Furthermore it is argued that rising powers such as China and India are likely to 
attract a greater volume of trade in the future, thus challenging the influence of the EU and its 
ability to act in this area. The trade dominance the EU has enjoyed for a longer period of time 
is challenged by the Chinese and Indian access to fast growing economies (Keukeleire & 
MacNaughton 2008:200). The notion that the EU is being contested when it comes to trade 
dominance is discursively reproduced from within as even former European Commissioner 
for Trade, Peter Mandelson has declared that Europe has to accept “fierce competitio n” from 
especially China (EC 2006b). However, and as McCormick points to, this assumption cannot 
question the EU’s position as an economic colossus and trading giant, why CPE in an 
economic sense is still very relevant in both policy and academic circles (McCormick 
2007:84).  
3.1.3. Normative Power Europe 
The concept of normative power is derived from the civilian power mentioned above but puts 
an emphasis to the ideational impact of the EU and its international identity. The term is 
largely constructed around the idea that the concepts of civilian- and military power are 
limited as they strive to understand the EU as a state-like entity. Ian Manners, being the 
founding father of the Normative Power Europe (NPE) conception describes the problems 
that surround civilian- and military power as goes: 
One of the problems with the notions of civilian and military power is their 
unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the EU looks. The concept of 
normative power is an attempt to refocus analysis away from the empirical 
emphasis on the EU’s institutions and policies, and towards including cognitive 
processes, with both substantive and symbolic components (Manners 2002:239). 
As the quote above expresses, values are very central to the concept of power within NPE. 
Europe’s attainment of power is normative rather than empirical and its attractive force is so 
great that others have enormous interest in being associated with it. Europe, or the EU if you 
will, is setting the scene and world standards in normative terms (Rosecrance 1998:22). In 
analysing the normative basis of the EU, Manners identifies five core norms and four minor 
norms (see Table 1). These norms that compromise the EU acquis communitaire and acquis 
politique have been developed throughout the past 50 years through a series of declarations, 
treaties, policies, criteria, and conditions. 
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Core Norms Minor Norms 
1. Peace 
2. Liberty 
3. Democracy 
4. Rule of Law 
5. Human Rights 
 
1. Social Solidarity 
2. Anti-discrimination 
3. Sustainable Development 
4. Good Governance 
Table 1 Normative Basis of NPE 
 
Manners furthermore suggests that the EU’s normative power stems from a variety of 
different factors that shape norm diffusion in international relations. These different ways of 
diffusing norms represent a combination of power by example (symbolic normative power) 
and power by relations (substantial normative power). These six factors are: 
 
 Contagion  – the unintentional diffusion by the EU 
 Informational  – strategic and declaratory communication by EU 
 Procedural  – institutionalisation of relationships by EU 
 Transference  – exchange of benefits by EU and third parties 
 Overt   – physical presence of EU in third states and organisations 
 Cultural filter  – cultural diffusion and political learning in third states and 
organisations (Manners 2002:244–5) 
 
Contagion diffusion of norms is entirely a symbolic power and is the result of the diffusion of 
ideas from the EU to other political actors. According to Manners, an example of this can be 
detected in the South American confederation of Mercosur, which can be perceived as an 
imitation of the earlier stages of the EU as it is founded as a union promoting free trade and 
the fluid movement of people, goods, and currency. Informational diffusion is largely a 
symbolic normative power and occurs through strategic communications such as new policy 
initiatives by the EU and declaratory communications. Procedural diffusion involves both 
symbolic- and substantial normative power as it represents the institutionalisation of 
relationships between the EU and third parties. This institutionalisation stretches from 
cooperation agreements to full memberships of the EU and this involves everything from the 
inner circle of EU integration to the outer periphery of its sphere of influence. 
 
Transference diffusion takes place when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid, or technical 
assistance with third parties through substantial normative power. Such a diffusion is often 
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the result of ‘the carrot and the stick’, which often concerns financial rewards and/or 
economic sanctions in the case of the EU. The physicality of overt diffusion can be 
exemplified through EU embassies, the role of Commission delegations, and monitoring 
missions like the ones deployed in the former Yugoslavia. This form of diffusion is both 
symbolic and substantial. The final factor in shaping norm diffusion is the cultural filter, 
which deals with the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of 
social and political identities by the subjects of norm diffusion (Manners 2002:245). Some 
exemplifications of cultural filtering are the diffusion of democratic norms in China and the 
human rights diffusion in Turkey. The normative diffusion of these two core norms by the 
EU to China and Turkey does not entail a complete replication of normative thinking but 
rather these core norms of the EU are negotiated and reproduced and put into different 
cultural frameworks. This means that some of the normative values will get ‘lost in 
translation’ through cultural interpretation. 
 
In opposition to civilian power, normative power is not as focussed on economic tools and 
does not rely on military capabilities at all in the production of power. This means, as is 
pointed to in the beginning of this section, that the EU can remove itself from the framework 
of state actors and become something new: a normative power. 
State of the Art: the inconsistency of norms and militarisation  
The concept of NPE has received resistance for various reasons. One of them is the neorealist 
critique from Hyde-Price arguing that the strategic interest of EU member states in its 
security and foreign policies questions the pure normative power of the Union (Hyde-Price 
2006:226–27). In the following paragraphs we will go more in depth with how the 
dissemination of the normative basis of the union is undermined when economical and 
political interests of EU member states conflict with them. 
 
One aspect of this is the EU’s effort to democratise Russia, where Wood argues that the 
Union has strategic interests at stake. Due to this its ability to project a ‘community of values’ 
becomes vulnerable and he refers specifically to the EU’s dependency on Russian energy 
supplies as a reason for the lack of normative capability (Wood 2009:125). Simply put, the 
leverage, which the Russians hold over the EU as major supplier of energy resources 
diminishes the normative power of the Union. Thus, when faced with resistance on the 
promotion of democracy and human rights, the EU becomes a powerless normative power 
23 
(Ibid:128). Another example is the EU’s desire to maintain a positive relationship with Israel, 
which has undermined its normative discourse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She claims 
that while the EU has called for international humanitarian law to be respected, the EU 
responded to Israel’s violations of international law by extending EU trade benefits (Tocci 
2008:19). This coincides with Pace’s argument, which emphasises the EU’s sceptical 
response to the Palestinian election in January 2006 (Pace 2007:1060). The lack of 
acknowledgement of the governing Hamas came to reflect an ignorance of the EU’s own 
promotion of fair, free and transparent elections as a crucial dimension of democracy (Pace 
2007:1060).  
 
Another very particular critique of the EU and its proclaimed normative power has been with 
reference to human rights. Despite the recognition of human rights the Union actually 
demonstrates inconsistency in its human rights policies (Smith 2001:193). As in the case of 
the promotion of democracy, “considerations of human rights compete with political, security 
and commercial considerations in foreign policy-making and states ignore human rights in 
‘friendly’ or ‘important’ countries” (Ibid). She argues that in relations with especially Russia 
and China, states that have enormous strategic, commercial and political interest to the EU, 
this behaviour of ignoring human rights violations has been present. 
 
The last critique of NPE actually comes from within, as Manners, one of the original 
advocates of NPE, argues that the recent militarization of the EU has jeopardised the EU’s 
normative basis. Manner points to that: 
as the recent experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq suggest, in situations where the 
EU may be seeking to shape post-conflict reconstruction, the mixing of military, 
political, civilian, and humanitarian agenda is both guaranteed and dangerous. 
Ultimately, the introduction of EU military forces in theatres and settings where 
only EU civilian staff once worked risks undermining the EU’s peaceful 
normative power in favour of a more robust, and potentially violent, presence [...] 
(Manners 2006:194).  
However others are arguing that the deployment of military forces is sometimes necessary to 
achieve normative goals. Here it is argued that during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the focus on 
democratic development and the rule of law in Kosovo was the key objective of the mission. 
These goals were achieved when EU member states took part in the 1999 military strikes 
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against the Milosevic regime (Tocci 2008:15–6). So military capabilities can in fact enhance 
the normative basis of the EU. It all comes down to whether one sees normative power as the 
diffusion of values with a willing receiver or if one justifies the means force in this process. 
3.2. Security Issues 
3.2.1. The Concept of Security 
In regard to our survey of neorealism we mentioned the term security without going into 
much detail about what the term actually implies. Security Studies is a whole sub-discipline 
of IR that deals with the issue (see for instance Collins 2010 for an introductory overview) 
and it is not the purpose of this project to elaborate on the academic discussion of the security 
concept. However, we want to mention briefly some essential developments since it is 
important to be aware of the numerous meanings and interpretations the term security can 
imply before moving on. 
 
The concept of security, traditionally referred to as national security, has changed over time 
and according to context and purpose (cf. Sheehan 2005:5; Paleri 2008:47). In the early 
academic and policy debate, originated in the United States, national security meant 
predominantly military security (Romm 1993:vii). Armed forces, diplomatic as well as 
intelligence services and economic strength were seen as means to maintain the state’s 
political independence and freedom of action (cf. Sheehan 2005:6). The focus on military 
security does not mean that scholars and policy makers were not aware of the importance of 
other issues but they subordinated them to military security (cf. ibid.:11). Cooper gives a 
broader definition of national security as “the capacity of a society (nation) to enjoy and 
cultivate its culture and values” (Cooper 1975:192). This definition takes into account both 
external as well as internal threats. The realist reading of security dominated the discussion 
among academics and policy makers for most of the 20th century and shaped national 
security policies.  
 
Although security was an important concept during this time, Baldwin observed that there 
was not enough "serious attention” to the term (Baldwin 1997:9). After the  end of the Cold 
War Romm noted that “existing security paradigm is increasingly inadequate” (Romm 
1993:1). During the 1990s, the state- and military-centred notion of security was challenged 
by more diverse approaches. According to Romm, military security is still an integral aspect 
25 
of national security but its importance has declined “relative to the issues of economic, 
energy, and environmental” (Ibid.). The traditional notion of security has been challenged 
both by academics and policy makers especially since the breakdown of the Soviet Union 
(Sheehan 2005:2). The reconceptualisation was also triggered by globalisation processes and 
the growing impact of mankind on the environment (Brauch 2011:61). The so called wide 
and narrow debate broke out among academics. The wideners criticise the traditional 
narrowing of security to military security and centrality of the state, whereas traditionalists 
responded that security is about war and a widening of the concept bears the threat of 
breaking its intellectual coherence (cf. Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998:2–5). There are two 
very influential approaches located in the group of the wideners. Both are associated with the 
so-called Copenhagen school and their leading contributors, namely Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. In their work Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) 
they reject the traditional notion of security, which is limited to military security, and present 
an updated version of their concepts of sectoral analysis and securitization.  Based on the 
pivotal point of security as “the survival of collective units and principles”, they distinguish 
between military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security sectors. Each 
sector can face existential threats, which differ from sector to sector (Buzan, Wæver & de 
Wilde 1998:27–9). Securitization is the more interesting concept, because it does not simply 
aim to broaden the security term but deals with aspects of agenda setting. In this sense, 
securitization can be seen as radical form of ‘politicization’ and addresses the question of 
how an issue becomes a security matter (Ibid.:23–6). Both concepts are insofar relevant to 
this project, as we will show how the EU is dealing with threats to the energy sector and how 
energy security moved up the agenda. The suitability of applying the Copenhagen School 
security considerations to energy security issues is also acknowledged by Belyi (2010:354). 
 
This brief insight to the scholarly discussion shows that the debate moved beyond the simple 
reduction of security to interstate security issues or threats from military forces. This is very 
well illustrated by Collins’ introductory edition to security studies, which includes nine 
essays to different approaches, lists six sectors of security and highlights ten traditional and 
non-traditional security issues (Collins 2010). Also, Paleri (2008) analyses 15 elements of 
national security: military, economic, resource, border, demographic, disaster, energy, 
geostrategic, informational, food, health, ethnic, environmental, cyber and genomic security. 
Energy security is the subject of this project and the importance of energy to modern societies 
is obvious.  
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3.2.2. Energy Security 
The bulk of the academic literature about energy security concentrates on its economic 
notion. These studies consider energy security as a framework which works as a policy tool 
for policymakers in nation states (cf. Von Hippel et al. 2011; Vivoda 2010; Sovacool 2011). 
There is no consensus on energy security’s precise definition (Kruyt et al. 2009:2166), but 
Sovacool and Rafey give a good and concise example of the definition of energy security as 
primarily an economic and social notion: “the challenge of equitably provid ing affordable, 
reliable, efficient, environmentally benign, properly governed and socially acceptable energy 
services” (2011:93). Quite often the dimensions of energy security are separated, as is the 
case in the definition given by Kruyt et al. in which the authors give four different aspects of 
energy security: availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability (2009:2167). 
Availability concerns elements relating to geological existence, accessibility geopolitical 
elements, affordability economical elements and acceptability environmental and social 
elements (Ibid.).    
 
The IR literature lack a generally accepted definition of energy security as well, but Raphael 
& Stokes provide us with a useful definition of the concept: 
Energy security exists when there are energy sources large enough to meet the 
need of the political community (the energy demands), which include military, 
economic and societal activity. Those sources must be able to deliver such 
quantities of energy in a reliable and stable manner, and for the foreseeable future. 
As soon as these conditions are not met, there exists a problem of energy 
(in)security. (2010:379) 
As is common to the IR literature, here energy security is linked to various kinds of security. 
A shortfall of energy supply can impair a state’s industry and lead to a breakdown of the 
economic activity. In order to ensure the sustainable supply a state might use military power, 
which consequently affects the international security and human security. The vast reliance of 
the world population on fossil fuels (as coal, oil and gas) has a destructive impact on the 
environment (Raphael & Stokes 2010:379). Moreover,  realists expect that the growing 
demand for scarce fossil fuel resources will lead to a competition between the major powers, 
increasing the possibility of states using military power to ensure a sustainable supply of 
energy (Ibid.:383). 
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To conclude, there are different notions of energy security. One follows the definition of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), which is simply “the uninterrupted availability of energy 
sources at an affordable price” (IEA Energy Security). The IEA represents energy importer 
states and thus takes only the economic notion of energy security into consideration, where 
more elaborate definitions take other aspects into consideration, as is the case of Kruyt et al. 
(2009). The IR notion of energy security links it with other types of security, creating a broad 
definition of security.  
3.3. Interconnection between Global Actorness and Energy Security 
In the previous parts of our Theory Chapter we have portrayed the academic debate about 
whether the EU manifests or not as an actor in global politics and how energy security is 
embedded in the wider notion of security. There seems to be untapped academic potential in 
the connection between energy security and Global Actorness, which is particularly striking 
in regard to the European Union. 
 
All three readings on Global Actorness discussed earlier in this chapter put an emphasis on 
active foreign policy. The ability to formulate and implement foreign policy can be seen as 
the main condition for being a Global Actor (Bretherton & Vogler 2006:35, 218). This holds 
true for the neorealist reading of the EU as well as for the notions of the EU as a normative 
actor (the values of the EU provide the framework for external policies) and the civilian 
power Europe (focus on diplomatic power in multilateral settings). Thus the studies related to 
the topic address the actors’ abilities to promote its own security globally. However, the 
connection between a Global Actor and energy security has experienced little interest in 
academia so far. This is particularly striking since energy security is acknowledged a serious 
matter in global politics and considered a field where large scale conflict is still possible (see 
e.g. Moran & Russel 2009:2). Given the particular importance policy makers and academia 
attach to energy security, we expected to come across a vast abundance of studies about the 
subject in regard to the European Union. As a matter of fact, we asserted that this was not the 
case. Academics seem to neglect energy security in their studies about the EU’ global 
actorness and vice versa. Müller-Kraenner highlights the real life importance of linking 
energy security with foreign policy for the EU in introduction to his book Energy Security: 
“without a common European energy policy, there can be no convincing EU foreign policy” 
(2007:xii). Even though the energy security issues have gained more prominence in the EU 
publications, academia has not followed suit. Most of the academic discussion of energy 
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security and the EU is carried out between energy (political) economists on the pages of 
Energy Policy journal, not by political scientists in various IR publications. Duffield and 
Birchfield conclude that “surprisingly little has been written on EU energy policy” (2011 :6). 
Even a special issue on “EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness 
and Effectiveness” in International Relations (Vol 27, Issue 3, 2013) elaborates on the EU as 
Global Actor in respect to different policy areas, a search for a contribution on energy 
security, though, is futile. Youngs goes as far as to state that “the issue of energy security has 
remained virtually absent from studies of EU foreign policy [...] and where it is addressed as 
a foreign-policy concern it increasingly tends to be through a Russia-specific lens” (2009:5; 
recent articles on EU-Russia energy relations are e.g. Casier 2011; Kuzemko 2014; Schmidt-
Felzmann 2011). There is no doubt that the EU’s special ties with Russia and especially 
Russian fossil fuel imports is the single most important aspect of the energy related foreign 
policy of the Union. Studies about EU-Russian energy relations expose, for instance, the 
growing interests of the European Commission to extend its foreign policy competences (e.g. 
Schmidt-Felzmann 2011). However, only looking into the Russian relations misses the point 
of the EU’s Global Actorness: there is more into a comprehensive view on the EU’s actorness 
than its relations to its biggest neighbour. By including energy security into the discussion 
about Global Actorness we are able to overcome this shortcoming. 
29 
4. Analysis of EU Energy Policies 
Energy policies have climbed the political agenda of the EU in recent years. This can be 
noted in the increased publication of energy related green and white papers, communications 
and strategy reviews (EC 1995a; b; 2000; 2006a; 2007; 2008a; b; 2010; 2014a; 2015a). The 
first part of the analysis will give a historical review of the development of energy policies 
before moving on to introduce the most recent additions to the energy discussion: Energy 
Union proposal (EC 2015a).   
4.1. Historical Development of Energy Policies 
Energy was at the epicentre of the European integration in its infancy, which is evident from 
the fact that two out of the three founding European Communities were explicitly linked to 
energy resources (ECSC and EURATOM). However, this focus on energy waned in 
importance over the years, even though energy issues were prominent during the 1970s oil 
crisis and the slow realisation of the impact of climate change after that. This was not because 
of a lack of trying from the EU: there was at least one effort to establish a common European 
energy policy every decade since the mid-1950s (Duffield & Birchfield 2011:3–4). However, 
the resistance of the member states blocked every one of these initiatives and the security of 
supply of energy was organised separately in the member states, even avoiding any 
infrastructural dependency on other member states (Belyi 2009:205). The Commission did 
not have a legal authority to create common energy policies up until the Lisbon Treaty: it has 
only been since 2009 that the EU and the member states share competency in energy issues 
(TFEU: Article 4).  
 
It appears that the lack of legal authority did not prevent the Commission to actively propose 
different measures to create a common European energy policy. Moreover, the proposed 
measures have remained remarkably similar over the past 20 years. In 1994 the Commission 
published a Green Paper, which opened a debate of then the European Community’s role in 
energy policy (EC 1995a:5). The debate was followed by a Commission White Paper, which 
gave policy guidelines to uniforming European energy policies. The paper presented three 
main objectives for the Community’s energy policy: security of supply, overall 
competitiveness and environmental protection (EC 1995b:14). Even though these objectives 
were not included in the Community law, they had significant influence on policy-makers 
perceptions (Belyi 2009:207). These objectives were to be completed by following guidelines 
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which were grouped to four priorities: Integration of the market, Managing e xternal 
dependency, Sustainable development, and Energy technology and research (EC 1995b:16–
37). As the White Paper was written close after the creation of the single European market in 
1994, the first priority was deemed as the most important, as is apparent in the following 
quote from the Paper: “Market integration is the central, determining factor in the 
Community’s energy policy” (EC 1995b:3). 
 
European energy policies multiplied in the 2000s. The decade saw “a veritable explosion of 
proposals, directives, and regulations that touched upon almost every aspect of energy 
policy” Duffield and Birchfield 2011:5). The work on completing the internal energy market 
was and remains to be laborious; it is still on-going, even though the European Council 
concluded that the work should be finished by the end of 2014 (EUCO 2011). Environmental 
policies were also furthered in the beginning of 2000s. These scattered pursuits were 
collected together under the Commission’s comprehensive energy policy for Europe (EC 
2007). The Commission was not alone with its pursuit of energy policies: the Parliament and 
Council adopted numerous Commission proposals regarding renewables, energy efficiency, 
the construction of energy infrastructure, reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, and the 
security of energy supplies (Duffield and Birchfield 2011:5–6). These development were 
accompanied by the inclusion of energy issues to the EU’s external relations with strategic 
partners, e.g. in the form of EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, Energy Community of South East 
Europe and a Memorandum of Understanding on energy cooperation with Ukraine. As 
Youngs concludes, “[b]y 2007, energy was a prominent issue in nearly all external political 
dialogues (Youngs 2011:44). 
4.2. EU definition of Energy Security 
The EU defined the goals of its energy security strategy in 2000 as follows: 
ensuring [...] the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the 
market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), 
while respecting environmental concerns and looking towards sustainable 
development (EC 2000:2).  
Hence the EU gives a definition of energy security, which entails explicitly economic, 
environmental and social aspects. Following the dimensions for economic definition of 
energy security given by Kruyt et al. (2009:2166), these are part of the affordability and 
31 
accessibility notions. Moreover, “ensuring [...] physical availability of energy products on the 
market”, mirrors the availability and accessibility notions: the  energy products are promised 
to be on the market either through domestic production or external imports. The Commission 
used the same definition of energy security almost word for word in Energy 2020 Strategy 
(EC 2010). Many questions, though, arise from this definition: what is the relative 
importance of the different aspects of energy security? Can different aspects be contradictory 
with each other? The following paragraphs aim to give more clarity to the EU’s definition of 
energy security.  
 
Lilliestam and Patt argue that there are five clearly visible dimensions in the EU’s own 
conceptualisation of energy security, which are 1) internal energy market, 2) energy 
efficiency, 3) infrastructure and crisis response capacity, 4) access to domestic resources, 
managing import dependency and 5) access to foreign resources, managing import risks 
(2012:9–12). Linkages between the energy policy priorities outlined in EC 1995b and these 
energy security dimensions are clearly visible; the EU has been consistent in its definition of 
energy security from 1995 to 2010 (period in focus by Lilliestam and Patt 2012).  Table 2 
presents the EC 1995b priorities, EC 2000 energy security definition and Lilliestam and 
Patt’s dimensions in relation to economic energy security dimensions provided by Kruyt et 
al. (2009).  
 
It can be concluded that the EU notion of energy security has remained unchanged in the 
beginning of the millennium and that it goes well hand in hand with economic notion of 
energy security provided by Kruyt et al (2009). It is worth emphasising that this is strictly an 
economic notion of energy security and does not include energy security as an inseparable 
part of broader notion of traditional security as discussed in the Theory Chapter. Youngs 
notes that “[i]n formal terms, the EU has staked out an approach to energy security that is 
based heavily on liberal internationalist norms” (2011:41). This explains the focus on internal 
market and institutional approach to external energy resource dependency. However, it needs 
to be emphasised that even if this was the case formally, the EU’s energy security policies 
can deviate from this line of thinking in reality. For example the European Energy Strategy 
from 2003 demonstrates that energy security’s importance to broader security is well 
acknowledged within the EU (EC 2003:2). 
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Kruyt et al. EC 1995b EC 2000 definition Lilliestam and Patt 
Availability 
Energy technology 
and research 
“uninterrupted physical availability 
of energy products ...” 
Access to domestic 
resources, manage import 
dependency 
Energy efficiency 
Accessibility 
Managing external 
dependency 
“uninterrupted physical availability 
of energy products on the market” 
Access to foreign 
resources, manage import 
risks 
Infrastructure and crisis 
response capacity 
Affordability 
Internal Energy 
Market 
“a price which is affordable…” Internal Energy Market 
Acceptability 
Sustainable 
development 
“respecting environmental concerns 
and looking towards sustainable 
development” 
 
Energy efficiency 
Table 2 Definitions of Energy Security 
4.3. Old Wine in New Bottles? 
We have above illustrated a historical account of the EU energy policies. In this part of our 
analysis we will go into details of two recent policy papers from the European Commission. 
The first one is the European Energy Security Strategy from 28 May 2014 (EC 2014a) and 
the second one A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy (here referred to as the Energy Union proposal) from 25 February 
2015 (EC 2015a). We will introduce both documents to the reader and outline that they do 
not formulate extraordinary new policies. They are rather comprehensive papers aiming to 
present a unified approach on energy policy. By analysing the papers’ co ntent, we will 
highlight the most relevant aspects in terms of foreign power capability. In this context, we 
will draw not only on academic studies but also on recent think tank papers since those have 
in contrast to academia already produced material regarding the Energy Union proposal. 
Doing this will equip us with the necessary knowledge to go into a discussion about the 
impact of the Energy Union proposal on the three predominant narratives we have presented 
in the Theory Chapter (Great, Civilian and Normative Power Europe). 
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European Energy Security Strategy and the Energy Union Proposal  
The idea of an Energy Union was first proposed by then Prime Minister of Poland, Donald 
Tusk, who is today President of the European Council. In an article for the online edition of 
the Financial Times, he proposes his idea and draws the line to the roots of the European 
idea: 
Whether in coal, steel, uranium, credit or gas, the principal idea of the EU has 
always been to bring Europe together, deepening our security and establishing fair 
rules where the free market is lacking. An energy union, too, would be based on 
solidarity and common economic interests (Tusk 2014, 21 April). 
The call for an Energy Union was welcomed by the Commission in the European Energy 
Security Strategy (EC 2014a:17) from May 2014. This strategy exposes short, medium and 
long term actions in different areas to respond to energy security issues and underlines the 
importance of member states coordinating their provisions with each other and the 
Commission. The proposed set of actions encompasses the following measures: 
 
1. Immediate actions aimed at increasing the EU's capacity to overcome a major disruption 
during the winter 2014/2015; 
2. Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms including coordination of risk assessments 
and contingency plans; and protecting strategic infrastructure; 
3. Moderating energy demand; 
4. Building a well-functioning and fully integrated internal market; 
5. Increasing energy production in the European Union; 
6. Further developing energy technologies; 
7. Diversifying external supplies and related infrastructure; 
8. Improving coordination of national energy policies and speaking with one voice in external 
energy policy. (EC 2014a) 
 
The first measure was only a short-term provision to secure energy supply during the 
upcoming winter period. The other measurements, though, are medium- or long-term 
provisions on the EU’s role on energy security. In general all proposed measures are, as 
openly conceded by the Commission, intended to improve the collective approach on energy 
security and act in more coherent in external action (EC 2014a: 3). The newly appointed 
President of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker put the Energy Union on the list of 
priorities of the European Commission in July 2015 and appointed one of his Vice Presidents 
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to lead the project. In February 2015, right before a summit of the European Council, the 
Commission presented the Energy Union Package, accepted by the European Council in 
March 2015. According to this paper, the Energy Union is based on five interrelated 
dimensions: 
 
1. Energy security, solidarity and trust; 
2. A fully integrated European energy market; 
3. Energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand; 
4. Decarbonising the economy, and 
5. Research, Innovation and Competitiveness (EC 2015a:4) 
 
Fifteen action points underpin these five dimensions in order to implement the Energy Union. 
These action points are very much in line with the former policies of the EU and not 
completely new proposals. In this regard, the Energy Union can be seen as a continuation of 
existing EU policies, as exemplified most notably in the case of the internal energy market, 
whose completion is still regarded as a “key driver for energy security” (EC 2015a:4). Also, 
the EU has already exercised at length its competency in environmental issues. The European 
Union puts high importance on environmental concerns and renews their emphasis on the 
idea of an Energy Union. However, especially in terms of diversification of supply of energy, 
the Commission calls for “resolute action at the EU level” in order to tackle the issue (EC 
2015a:4). Furthermore, the Energy Union proposal renews the importance that the EU acts as 
coherent unit and “speaks with one voice in negotiations with third countries” (Ibid.:7). By 
getting access to intergovernmental agreements already before they are signed and move the 
regulatory framework from member states to the European level, the Commission proposes 
new institutions, which would shift power from the member state level to the EU (Ibid.). 
4.4. Expectations of the EU 
The development of the EU’s energy policies since the mid-1990s, leads us to the conclusion 
that the EU has set a number of expectations for itself, which are broad in terms but closely 
linked to energy security issues. In the most recent energy policy papers of the EU from 2014 
and 2015, we can identify five of those expectations: 
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1. A fully functioning internal energy market 
2. Speaking with a single voice in terms of external energy affairs 
3. Decreasing the dependency on energy imports and 
4. Promoting renewables and leading the fight against climate change  
 
These five expectations are all closely interlinked by their main concern. The numbering does 
not reflect a clear hierarchy among these five expectations: the order here is derived from the 
EU’s emphasis on different issues in its energy policies over the years. However, the three 
different narratives on the global role of the European Union give different weight to the five 
expectations, as we will demonstrate in a later stage of this analysis. Now we will go into 
detail about the expectations. 
(1) A Fully Functioning Internal Energy Market  
“The key to improved energy security lies first in a more collective approach through a 
functioning internal market” (EC 2014a:3). 
 
Completing the single market has been the EU’s objective since the European Economic 
Area (EEA) was established in 1994. However, the idea to extend the single market to energy 
discloses difficulties since various national rules and subsidies exist (Zachmann 2014:3). 
Moreover, national energy regulations divide the member states into two camps: some of 
them deem the creation of the internal market as the only way to achieve greater security of 
energy supply whereas others fear that markets alone cannot take into account all the security 
issues important for them (Eikeland 2011:26–33). The latter group of member states fear that 
fully liberalised internal market would undermine their national sovereignty (Ibid.32). 
Despite these concerns, the European Council emphasised the need for fully functioning 
energy market in 2011 (EUCO 2011:1).  
(2) A Single Voice in External Energy Affairs  
“The EU will use all external policy instruments to ensure that a strong, united EU engages 
constructively with its partners and speaks with one voice on energy and climate” (EC 
2015a:21). 
 
According to the TFEU the EU shares competency with the member states in terms of energy 
policies. Consequently, there is no coherent external energy policy (this in clear contrast to 
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e.g. climate policies where the EU leads negotiations in behalf of the member states). This 
leads to various national positions regarding energy contracts and suppliers. The Commission 
fears that use of energy resources as a foreign policy tool would give more assertive 
negotiation partners unnecessary leverage over single member states (EC 2015a:5). 
Furthemore, including the EU in negotiations ensures that completed deals are in full 
compliance with EU law. At the moment, the member states have to inform the EU only after 
they have done a bilateral energy supply contract with a third country (EC 2014a:18).  
(3) Decreasing Dependency on Energy Imports  
“The EU needs, therefore, a hard-headed strategy for energy security which promotes 
resilience to these shocks and disruptions to energy supplies in the short term and reduced 
dependency on particular fuels, energy suppliers and routes in the long-term” (EC 2014a:2). 
 
It is the intention of the EU to tackle its dependency on energy imports by “diversification of 
energy sources, suppliers and routes” (EC 2015a:4). This includes increase of domestic 
energy production, increasing energy efficiency and hence diminishing overall energy 
consumption, diversification of energy supply countries and transit routes from those 
countries. The EU is aware of the stark future it is facing with fossil fuel and nuclear energy 
imports: while at the moment the EU is already importing over half of its energy, this 
dependency will grow significantly without policy measures (EC 2014a:2, 15–6). The 
diversification is not only reduced to conventional fossil sources. A special importance is put 
on producing domestic energy by renewables in order to reduce imports to fulfill the EU’s 
commitment to lead the fight against climate change (EC 2015a:5; see below). However, the 
Commission also cautiously considers “unconventional sources” as shale gas, a controversial 
method of producing gas, which is believed to be very harmful to the environment. Apart 
from the contrast with the environmental aspirations, the aim to decrease dependence on 
imports is not compatible with the idea of all encompassing interdependent global energy 
market ensuring energy security.  
(4) Promoting Renewables and Leading the Fight against Climate Change  
“Our vision is of the Energy Union as a sustainable, low-carbon and climate-friendly 
economy that is designed to last” (EC 2015a:2). 
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The European Union confirms its commitment to fighting climate change and curb 
environmental devastation by integrating its environmental undertakings into the Energy 
Union. Environmental issues were integral part of the EU’s papers on energy since 1994. The 
EU emphasises that it has to continue to lead the way globally in limiting the effects of 
climate change and thus become “the world leader in renewable energy” (EC 2015a:14–5). 
The EU’s role in international environmental negotiations has been recognised and it is one 
of the only fields where its Global Actorness has been widely acknowledged (see for example 
Vanden Brande 2011; Bretherton & Vogler 2006:89–111; Vogler 2011; Biedenkopf & 
Dupont 2013). The EU is “committed in becoming the world leader in renewable energy” 
(EC 2015a:15), to which it therefore attaches high importance (EC 2010:5). However, the 
commitment to these values can undermine other aspects of the Union’s ambition to achieve 
energy security. Concerns of short term security of supply are contradictory with 
environmental values, especially if the EU starts to invest more in domestic production of 
coal and shale gas as the Commission has hinted in recent years (EC 2014a:13; EC 2015a:5). 
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5. Discussion of Impact on Narratives 
5.1. Great Power Europe 
In Chapter 3.1 we have portrayed how neorealists interpret the EU’s Global Actorness. At 
heart, neorealism is about security concerns and, thus, deals with high politics. Neorealism 
considers only those actors relevant in the structural anarchic system that are coherent in 
formulating and implementing foreign policies However, low politics are important when 
they can affect high politics. This is why economic questions are important for neorealism. 
Energy security is another form of low politics that can have a significant impact on an 
actor’s high politics capabilities. Securing energy is vital in order to keep a modern economy 
functioning, and even more importantly modern military is irrevocably reliant on energy. In 
the neorealist reading energy security is an inseparable part of the broader notion of security. 
Hence every independent actor has to deal with its own energy security questions. Thus the 
question arises: does the Energy Union alleviate the energy security questions from the 
member state level to the EU level? Keeping in mind the expectations discussed in the 
previous part of the analysis, the second one dealing with the single voice in external affairs 
becomes the most important one for neorealist thinking. Another question is whether the 
Energy Union will improve the EU’s or its member states’ structural position in the 
international system (related to expectation #3). This part of the analysis is divided to three 
sections: first is concerned with the question whether the Energy Union could give the EU 
possibility to speak in one voice on behalf of the member states, the second with the impact 
on the EU’s structural economic power and the third with military considerations. 
Europe’s Multiple Voices in Energy 
As noted earlier, the EU was given a shared competency in energy issues in the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty but the member states remained in charge of managing their security of energy 
supplies. In the Energy Union proposal, the Commission makes two proposals that infringe 
this division of labour: creating an EU level regulatory body on energy issues that can 
overrule decisions made on member state level and amending the decision concerning the 
requirement of member states to share information on bilateral energy deal with third 
countries (EC 2015a:7–8; see also Giuli 2015). At the moment the Agency for Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) is designed to only assist member states’ regulatory bodies. Belyi 
(2009:208) argues that transferring regulatory power from the member states to the EU level 
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would decrease member state sovereignty since they would lose control of their national 
energy market and thus security of supply considerations.  
 
The latter change is less significant: already at the moment the member states are required to 
share all of their bilateral energy deals on the EU level (OJ 2012). If the Council agrees with 
the proposal the member states would have to share information before a deal is struck. This 
does not mean that they would have to ask for the EU’s permission to sign the deal, but it 
would mean that the EU and other member states would have time to act before the deal is 
done (cf. Giuli 2015). In any case all the deals signed with third countries need to comply 
with EU market rules. A recent case where the EU intervened in an energy deal with a 
member state is the cancellation of South Stream gas pipeline. 
 
The response to 2006 and 2009 Ukraine-Russian gas disputes is a fine example of the 
incoherent external energy policies of the EU and the member states. Germany had already 
signed a deal with Russia to construct Nord Stream in mid-2010 (cf. De Jong & Schunz 
2012:172–3), a pipeline under the Baltic Sea circumventing the trad itional transit countries 
Belarus and Ukraine. Moreover, a study about the security implications of the Nord Stream 
compiled for the European Parliament states bluntly that the decision to construct the pipeline 
offshore cut off several EU member states (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland), thus dividing 
member states into those who gain and whose who lose from the project (Larsson 2008:14–
6). Similarly to the German decision, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria signed deals with 
Gazprom in favour for the South Stream project, the main rival to the EU backed Nabucco 
pipeline. Austria gave its final approval to the deal with Russia in 2014, despite the boiling 
crisis in Ukraine, which was intended to be bypassed by the South Stream. 
 
Whereas the completion of Nord Stream shows that infringement of EU market rules is not 
enough to halt building a gas pipeline (Gazprom owns 51% of the pipeline, Nord Stream 
Website), the destiny of the South Stream shows that those same rules can be used as a 
foreign policy tool if there is enough political will. There are also other ways to use the EU’s 
market power to pressurise third countries. When Tusk (2014, 21 April) introduced the idea 
of a Union in his article in the Financial Times he called for a single European body which 
would buy Russian gas. This idea did not transform to reality in the proposal, but there is a 
mention of a possibility to create “mechanisms for collective purchasing of gas during a 
crisis” (EC 2015a:6). This is a highly vague proposal and it did not live up to the expectations 
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set by Tusk’s statements (Giuli 2015) but the mention itself denotes that the Commission sees 
collective buying as a possible way to confront energy export countries such as Russia. The 
Competition Commissioner Vestager’s charges to Gazprom for abusing market rules is 
another bright example how the EU can use its internal market as a powerful tool if it wants 
to (The Economist 2015, 25 April). 
The EU’s S tructural Economic Power 
Neorealism assumes that global politics is practised in and defined by its arena, which is an 
anarchical structure without a higher authority. Energy security issues are played out on the 
same arena (Baumann 2010:92). Energy policies affect both the EU’s military and economic 
structural power. We will first consider the more explicit economic impacts before going to 
military power.  
 
As stated in the first pages of the Energy Union proposal, the expenses stemming from 
imported energy resources undermine the EU’s economic power. The relation to the 
structural position of the EU is made clear by comparing the European unit energy prices to 
those in the US and how the difference makes the EU industry less competitive than its 
counterpart on the other side of the Atlantic (EC 2015a:2–3). Thus fulfilling the expectation 
#3 would increase the EU’s structural power: the less dependent an actor is on imports of 
energy, the higher its ability to manoeuvre in global politics. From a neorealist perspective it 
is a welcome notion to take all the possible domestic energy sources into consideration when 
trying to get rid of this dependency. This is why the EU should not shun away from the use of 
its domestic shale gas and coal deposits: their exploitation would decrease import 
dependency on medium term. However, the EU is more vocal about the promises of 
renewable energy (expectation #4), and this shows long-term strategic thinking. Using 
domestic fossil fuels can only be a medium-term solution at best since they will run out 
eventually. The same goes for nuclear energy: the EU is comple tely dependant on external 
uranium sources (EC 2014a:16). The only way to gain independence from energy imports in 
the long-term is the development of domestic renewable energy sources.  
 
Whilst the wider use of renewable energy is the only credible long-term solution to decrease 
import dependency, it cannot help the EU in short to medium term. The technology and 
infrastructure for renewable energy is still not there and this is why the investment on their 
research is one of the key pillars of the Energy Union (EC 2015a:16–7). Hence the EU is 
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doomed to dependency until renewable technology is on an appropriate level. Undesirable 
effects of import dependency can be mitigated or even avoided by diversifying import 
countries. The Commission states that while the international oil markets are open and 
enough not to create an immediate threat, the gas market are not (EC 2014a:10–1; 5). Gas 
markets are regional because of the most efficient means of transportation for it is a pipeline. 
Thus there has to be either more pipelines to different importing countries (Southern Gas 
Corridor) or a wider use of technology (LNG) that removes the restrictions provided by 
pipelines (EC 2015a:4–5).  
 
As stated above, the EU industry pays a bigger bill for energy than its counterparts in other 
parts of the world. This makes the EU structurally weaker in terms of economy than its 
competitors, especially in energy intensive industry. Especially the shale gas boom in the US 
and the European opposition to it have widened the energy price gap between the two sides 
of the Atlantic (cf. Zachmann 2014:2). One way to dig itself out of this hole is for the EU to 
make its competitors to pay higher energy bills as well. Hence the EU’s strong support for 
legally binding climate resolution in Paris 2015 (EC 2015b) could be seen as a means to 
increase its structural economic power by forcing other actors to restrict their use of abundant 
and cheap domestic fossil fuel resources. 
The EU’s Structural M ilitary Power 
The constant supply with energy resources is crucial to modern societies, not only in 
economic but also military terms. Robert Ebel, then Director of the Energy Program at 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington headquartered think tank, said 
already in 2002 to an audience in the U.S. Department of State: 
Oil fuels much more than automobiles and airplanes. Oil fuels military power, 
national treasuries, and international politics. [...] it is a determinant of well being, 
of national security, and international power for those who possess this vital 
resource and the converse for those who do not. (Ebel 2002) 
However, the Energy Union proposal does not consider military capacities, which are crucial 
to neorealist theory. According to neorealism, great powers are armed because they do not 
know about other great powers’ intentions. Yergin (2006:70) predicts that the world will 
increasingly rely on oil and gas from highly unstable regions as West Africa or the Caspian 
Sea: Armed conflicts, political disturbance, terrorism and piracy are serious threats to energy 
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infrastructure (Yergin 2006:70). Klare argues that violent struggles over control of energy 
assets or distribution of revenues from oil are central to many contemporary conflicts, 
because control over energy resources is “an essential component of national power” (Klare 
2014, 15 July). A most recent example is the ongoing conflict in the Ukraine. Seen from an 
energy resource perspective the annexation of the Crimea appears in a new light. With the 
seizure of the peninsula, Russia almost doubled its offshore territory in the Black Sea, which 
is believed to host billions of barrels of oil, natural gas and other natural resources (Ibid.). 
Russia, thus, has by military means strengthened its geostrategic position at Ukraine’s 
expense in terms of energy. Currently the EU does not seem to be in the position to securing 
new energy resources in the same manner as Russia did or even responding to other actors’ 
aggressive energy policies militarily.  
 
Disruption of supply can threaten a country’s economy because modern industry and 
transport relies on a constant supply of energy. Serious economic problems in turn can 
constitute a threat (e.g. famine) to a country’s citizens, which in consequence could attack 
and topple the regime type (cf. Raphael & Stokes 2010:379). We already mentioned that the 
energy market is increasingly globalised which makes transport crucial to energy security. 
Petroleum is mainly produced in the Middle East and shipped all over the world. Thanks to 
the increasing importance of LNG, more and more gas can be transported via the sea, too. 
There are many strategically important bottlenecks along the shipping routes of seaborne oil 
and gas: the Strait of Hormuz is a pivotal transport channel to the Persian Gulf, the Suez 
Canal provides the entrance into the Mediterranean, the Bab el Mandeb strait connects the 
Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, the Bosphorus strait, through which most of Russian and 
Caspian oil is transported and the Strait of Malacca, which is the main trade route for the oil 
for China, South Korea and Japan. A blockade of these shipping lanes can cause serious 
trouble to other parts of the world. A disruption of transport is relatively easily attainable 
through armed ships denying passage for merchant vessels (Yergin 2006:78–9). The Energy 
Union proposal does not mention any deployment of military capacities in order to ensure 
constant supply of energy. This seems to verify the neorealist interpretation of the EU, which 
we have presented in our Theory Chapter, negating the possibility of the EU to become a 
relevant Global Actor as long as it lacks military power to enforce or back its interests (e.g. 
Waltz 2000:32; Collard-Wexler 2006:424). However, the EU has shown that it is able to 
mount military operations to secure its interests, most notably with the EU-NAVFOR 
Operation Atalanta. This mission against piracy at the Horn of Africa is intended to directly 
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protect economic interests of the EU and its member states, because the operation addresses 
“piracy impacts on international trade and maritime security and on the economic activities 
and security of countries in the region” (EU-NAVFOR Website). The EU is not only trying 
to secure its economic interests with civilian missions but complementing them gradually 
with supplement military actions. A think tank report commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of 
Defence concludes that “the deployment of military and civilian EU operations contributes to 
EU economic security” (van Esch, de Jong & de Ridder 2014:83). We have seen that the EU 
member states are already able to act if they agree on common positions and actions and is 
thus becoming “a net exporter of security” (Kluth & Pilegaard 2011:6). However, these 
threats posed by bottlenecks can be avoided by adequate diversification of sources and 
suppliers, and this forms the bedrock of energy security policies as Yergin concludes: 
“Diversification will be the fundamental starting principle of energy security for both oil and 
gas” (Yergin 2006:82). 
Conclusionary Remarks 
Concluding, from a neorealist thinking the Energy Union can be a step towards becoming a 
Global Actor since the predominant condition for actorness is coherence. If all the aspects of 
the Energy Union proposal become reality and the EU manages to fulfil the expectations #1, 
#2, and #3 it would mean that the EU’s voice in energy issues would become if not 
completely unified, at least coherent. For Great Power Europe reading, expectation #2 is the 
most important to fulfil. Also, decreasing energy import dependency (expectation #3) is 
important since it would strengthen the EU’s economic and military structural position 
globally. Completing the internal market (expectation #1) is only a supplementary 
expectations working for the expectations #2 and #3. However, because of the 
aforementioned coherence condition, the EU cannot be viewed as a Global Actor from a 
neorealist perspective. The improvement of the EU’s structural position can for the most 
parts be seen as the improvements of its member states’ structural power. The increased 
power transferred to the EU could be seen as a rational trade-off from the side of member 
states, intended to improve their overall energy security environment. It is not the first time 
the member states forfeit part of their sovereignty to achieve this goal. We have shown that 
military aspect can still be a relevant issue in global politics. The EU, though, has no military 
forces at its disposal to secure energy resources and thus it relies on the military capacity of 
its member states. So in a neorealist perspective the Energy Union can push the EU to move 
in the direction of becoming a coherent actor, and thus an actor of increased relevance, 
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although it does not justify its lack of focus on military capabilities and connection of ene rgy 
security to the broader notion of traditional security.  
5.2. Civilian Power Europe 
In contrast to the neorealist narrative, the CPE concept is, as described in the Theory Chapter, 
putting a lot of emphasis on the economic and diplomatic power instead of military power 
and in so strives to solve international issues through multilateralism. Thus the EU’s 
emphasis on the economic definition of energy security and the decision not to include 
military considerations into the Energy Union proposal goes well hand in hand with Civilian 
Power thinking. The importance of multilateralism is however contested in the Energy Union 
initiative, which the analysis will go to show. We will now investigate how our identified 
expectations of the Energy Union are reflecting the three main categories that come to define 
the concept of CPE: economic power, power of diplomacy and emphasis on multilateralism. 
Impact on Economic Power 
As the Commission points out in the Energy Union Package, energy is very expensive for the 
EU and the European industry. The EU uses 400 billion euros annually to import energy and 
its industry suffers from significantly higher energy bills compared to its competitors outside 
the EU (EC 2015a:2–3). Hence this presents the EU with rather straight- forward equations: 
the less energy it imports, the smaller trade deficit it has with the rest of the world; and the 
less its industry has to pay for energy, the more competitive it comes in relation to its 
competitors. Thus, the expectations about the internal energy market and decreasing energy 
imports (#1 & #3) become the most relevant for the EU’s economic power. 
 
As stated earlier on several occasions, the completion of the internal market has been one of 
the main objects of the EU since the institutional birth of the market in 1993 (Chapter 4.1.3). 
The Commission states that the current situation in the energy market “does not lead to 
sufficient investments, market concentration and weak competition remain an issue” (EC 
2015a:7–8). The EU’s economy is based on the ideal of free markets and its attractiveness for 
foreign investors depends on the non-discriminatory nature of the European market. The 
national subsidies and protectionist rules undermine the optimal functioning of the market 
(EC 2015a:10). Despite this liberal economic thinking, the Commission states that some 
energy projects need public support, since the private sector cannot accumulate sufficient 
amount of investment on its own (Ibid.:8). Besides the argued goal of decreasing the energy 
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prices in the EU, completion of the internal energy market would have other benefits too. As 
one US based analyst notes, “This would not only make the EU a more attractive area for 
investment but also empower the EU to take a united stance toward suppliers—Russia in 
particular.” (Dempsey 2014). This notion combines the expectations #1 and #2 and their 
effectiveness is visible in the cancellation of the South Stream pipeline, in the market abuse 
charges laid on Gazprom and the investigation of member state subsidies for electric utilities 
(The Economist 2015, 2 May). By upholding European market rules the EU is able to 
diminish the market power of its energy trade partners. 
 
However, another kind of reading of the EU’s energy policies can be provided. On the one 
hand, the EU is promoting liberal and free market values including the positive consequences 
of mutual interdependence. Seeking independence from Russian energy supplies (according 
to  expectation #3) could be understood as undermining these values, since the position of 
interdependence is regarded as undesirable in a longer term (Youngs 2011:49). On the other 
hand, by gaining independence from one main exporter of energy sources through 
diversification of suppliers, sources, and routes, the EU will put itself into a better economic 
position vis-á-vis its exporters, especially Russia. As the internal market rules can also be 
designed to be protectionist, the EU can use them in order to restrict foreign access to the 
European energy market while continuing to perform lip service to the ideas of free market 
and market liberalisation to ensure its own investors access to foreign markets. Even though 
the Commission complains that energy resources are used as a foreign-policy tool, the 
consideration about collective gas purchasing makes it clear that when member states’ energy 
security is threatened, the liberal market ideas can be cast aside (EC 2015a:6). 
 
As concluded in the neorealist narrative section, there is no short to medium term solution to 
break the EU’s dependency on energy imports. Renewables provide the only sustainable 
domestic energy production possible, but there is no technology and infrastructure to utilise 
them so comprehensively that no other energy source would be needed. Whilst the need for 
momentous investment in renewables is imminent, this will restrain already weak European 
economy. The EU’s sluggish economic recovery might make it an onerous task to collect 200 
billion euros annually from the member states to improve the EU’s energy security (EC 
2015a:8). On the other hand, the EU’s previous and ongoing focus on green investment and 
technology might give its industry a competitive edge in the global green energy market in 
case major countries agree on legally binding and substantial international agreement on 
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climate change actions in the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in 
December 2015. 
Impact on Diplomatic Power 
The EU’s diplomatic power has been challenged since there are no clear actors that are 
executing the EU’s diplomacy or who are responsible for the EU’s external policy decisions. 
The EU answered Kissinger’s questions about the EU’s phone number with the creation of 
the seat of High Representative for Foreign Affairs in the Maastricht Treaty. However, 
Kissinger responded in an interview that even though the number now exists, Europe remains 
a vague negotiation partner because:  
Nation-states have not just given up part of their sovereignty to the European 
Union but also part of their vision for their own future. Their future is now tied to 
the European Union, and the EU has not yet achieved a vision and loyalty 
comparable to the nation-state. So, there is a vacuum between Europe's past and 
Europe's future (Spiegel 2008, 18 February). 
Creating a coherent voice and vision is one of the central expectations for the Energy Union 
(expectation #2). The Commission also indicates that completing the internal market 
(expectation #1) adds to the EU’s ability to speak with one voice in external energy relations. 
These measures are intended to increase the EU’s diplomatic power in relation to energy 
exporters. It is conspicuous that currently the EU is not able to exert its bargaining power to 
strike attractive energy deals with major oil and gas exporters, instead a patchwork of 
bilateral deals at different terms exists. The Commission is not the only EU institution that 
sees this as a problem needing an immediate solution: the European Council agreed to 
“maximise our clout”: “by ensuring consistency between member states' and EU foreign 
policy goals and by improving coordination and coherence between the main fields of EU 
external action, such as trade, energy, justice and home affairs, development and economic 
policies” (EUCO 2014:7). 
 
Remarkably, there is no direct reference to the HP/VP or the EEAS when considering new 
external energy measures. Instead the talk focuses on the Commission and the member states. 
This is noteworthy because the European Council specifically invited the HR/VP “to take 
fully account of the energy security dimension in her work” in 2011 (EUCO 2011:4). The 
absence of HR/VP in the Energy Union proposal and in dealing with the on-going Ukraine 
crisis (2014-) confirms the argument made by Helwig (2013:251–3) and Özoguz-Bolgi 
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(2013:15–6): even though the Lisbon treaty gave the EU external policy institutional 
capabilities, their use is still very much dependent on the will of the member states. It seems 
like there is no such will in relation to energy policies. 
 
We mentioned above that the Energy Union proposal does not include any military action to 
secure energy. Instead, the EU is focusing on its economic power as a tool to back its 
bargaining power in international disputes. A bright example of this can be seen in the EU’s 
response to the on-going Ukraine crisis, where the EU collectively set economic sanctions on 
Russia and have given economic help to Ukraine. These actions suggest that the EU prefers 
the use of civilian power over military power in its diplomatic relations. 
Multilateralism  
The CPE idea is based on the EU striving to find solutions to its international problems 
through multilateral bargaining with relevant actors. For example, if the EU would be faced 
with a disruption of energy supply, the EU would try to solve the problem with the exporting 
country, the exporting company (or companies), the importing company (or companies), and 
possibly with transit countries. For this end the EU should promote multilateral institutions, 
which could provide the means to find a solution to a possible intergovernmental problem in 
energy issues. The EU, its member states, and its main energy exporters have formed several 
of these institutions, most important are the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy 
Community of South East Europe, which was later simply named Energy Community. 
However, it is clear that the EU cannot count on these institutions when energy security is 
threatened, mainly because Russia is not part of neither of the two. The Energy Charter 
Treaty never lived to its expectations and became mundane when the Russian Duma did not 
ratify it (Grätz 2011:64–7). The Energy Community’s membership consists only of importing 
and transit countries and provides an institution for solving a problem between them, but not 
between importers and exporters. Consequently, according to the Energy Union proposal the 
EU should focus on “strategic partnerships” with its current and upcoming exporting 
countries (EC 2015a:6–7). The word multilateral is not mentioned once in the document. It is 
proposed that the partnership with Russia should be renegotiated “[w]hen the time is right” 
(Ibid.:7). Rather ironically, Grätz argues that the EU did not manage to do this when the time 
was right in the 90s, as the EU had insurmountable difficulties finding a common voice in the 
Energy Charter Treaty talks leading to continuous stalling of the ratification of the treaty by 
all signatory countries (2011:64–80). The main reason for focussing on strategic partnership 
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rather than seeking to negotiate with Russia through multilateral institutions could be found 
in the special circumstances of energy security. In finding solutions to common issues such as 
climate change, the approach of multilateralism and diplomatic negotiation seems ideal. On 
the contrary it is difficult to see how a multilateral negotiation between EU member states 
and Russia (importer and exporter) could end up with both sides being satisfied, as the gains 
and losses are relative. Thus in the EU relation to Russia on energy matters, the multilateral 
instrument of CPE seems rather powerless.  
 
Multilateralism is a means for a Civilian Power to exert its will to other international actions 
and thus expectation #4 deserves special attention since the diplomatic power of the EU to 
fight climate change and strike a substantial multilateral deal in terms of climate change will 
be tested. The United Nations Climate Change Conference provides a perfect setting for the 
EU to achieve its goals related to the expectation #4, leading the fight against climate change. 
The Commission deems this as an integral part of achieving the goals set on the Energy 
Union Package by presenting a separate communication named The Paris Protocol (EC 
2015b) as part of the Package. As discussed in Normative Power Europe section, this gives 
the EU a chance to have a great influence on the global climate change policies for the 
following years. A legally binding, substantial agreement would be in the EU’s interests not 
only because it would help alleviate the environmental catastrophe of climate change, but 
also because it would give it structural advantages in relation to rest of the world.  
 
The original initiative of the Energy Union by Donald Tusk in spring 2014 involved joint gas 
purchase, this probably as a response to Russian geopolitical outbursts, and the EU having a 
decisive role in negotiations between member states and external partners. This did however 
not materialise and the initiative was toned down considerably: collective purchase of gas is 
voluntary and only occurs in times of emergency (EC 2015a:6). However, the Energy Union 
proposal proposes to integrate the European Commission into intergovernmental agreements 
(Ibid.:7). According to one Brussels-based analyst, this is a sign of the EU preferring to deal 
with energy exporters liberally rather than in a mercantilist manner (Giuli 2015). However, as 
bizarre as it sounds the mercantilist approach would actually constitute an act of 
multilateralism within it. The European body would have been constituted of the member 
states, which export their gas, which would have meant that this multilateral institution would 
have negotiated energy deals on behalf of its members. Nevertheless, as made clear by the 
idea’s forefather, Donald Tusk, this body would have been used mainly to flex muscles 
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against one main exporter, Russia. Giuli (2015) states that had the proposal fallen through, it 
could have been used as an “anti-Russian construction”, resulting in excessive pressure on 
Russia. One might suspect that the Commission was more or less forced to leave out the idea 
of a joint purchase of gas, as it would be most difficult to get some of the member states who 
have beneficial agreements with the Russians to cede sovereignty on bilateral energy deals 
(Hungary and Germany in terms of low prices, Slovakia in terms of transit fees etc) (Giuli 
2015). It can be argued that pursuing of such a powerful single voice would have jeopardised 
the CPE thinking by neglecting the possibility of finding a joint solution to the energy 
security problem with all relevant countries, including Russia. 
Conclusionary Remarks 
Conclusively, the proposal for the Energy Union goes well hand in hand with CPE thinking: 
its focus on the internal energy market (expectation #1) as the provider of energy security 
emphasises the economic, market based solution to the energy security problem. The energy 
dependence (expectation #3) is seen as a problem that undermines the EU’s economic power 
and hence makes it relatively weaker to exporting countries in diplomatic relations. However, 
the only credible way out of the dependency (decarbonisation of economy) is expensive and 
the needed investments challenge Europe’s already ailing economy. According to CPE the 
EU should be able to mitigate the dependency problem through multilateral action, which it is 
not doing; the EU is stuck with bilateral diplomatic solutions in securing its energy sources 
since multilateral institutions do not exist. On the other hand the upcoming UNFCC in Paris 
provides a multilateral setting where the EU has a chance to influence global climate change 
policies according to its own interests (expectation #4). Coherence of external energy policy 
and speaking with one voice (expectation #2) would enhance the EU’s position in both 
bilateral and multilateral settings. 
5.3. Normative Power Europe 
The analysis of how EU energy policy affects the concept of NPE very much revolves around 
how these policies facilitate normative diffusion by the EU. Critiques of NPE suggest that 
inconsistency in acting in accordance with its normative basis can result in a decrease in 
legitimacy, why it is of special interest to investigate whether the forming of the Energy 
Union would enhance the EU’s chances of being consistent with its normative basis (Core 
Norms: Peace, Liberty, Democracy, Rule of Law, Human Rights; Minor Norms: Social 
Solidarity, Anti-discrimination, Sustainable Development, Good Governance). Furthermore 
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we will look at if some of the developments within EU and its energy security policies can 
potentially undermine the normative basis of the EU. Before moving on with the analysis it is 
important to emphasise that the policies and proposals we are investigating actually represent 
a sense of normative diffusion in their mere existence. Here we are referring to the concept of 
informational diffusion, which acknowledges the communicatory capabilities of policy 
proposals as a powerful instrument. However, we will need to dig a bit further to determine 
whether recent energy policies and especially the proposal for the Energy Union from 2015 
increase the EU’s Global Actorness within the concept of normative power. In this part of the 
analysis we will consider the connections between the four EU energy policy expectations 
and NPE’s core and minor norms in context of three issues: the case of Russia, inner EU 
solidarity and climate and environmental action. 
Consistency of N orms and the Case of Russia 
An important critique raised by the opposition of NPE is the inconsistency of the EU’s 
projection and promotion of its normative basis. One of the examples brought forward is the 
case of Russia, where the EU has substantial strategic interests, as Russia is its most 
important exporter of gas. It is argued that in its relations with Russia the EU has had a 
tendency to abandon the core value of promoting democracy in trading (See chapter 3.1.3). 
Thus the EU fails to promote its values effectively outside its borders. According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) 50% of the Russian budget came from activities in 
oil and natural gas, especially from export revenues (EIA Website). What is more, Moscow 
needs an oil price of 105 USD per barrel to balance its budget (The Economist 2014, 30 
September). However, it is not only Russia that relies on exporting oil and gas, also many 
member states of the EU are highly dependent on importing Russian gas and oil products. 
That is why the relationship can be framed as mutual interdependency.  
 
The levelling of the playfield in negotiations with Russia does not change the fact that there 
are strategic interests in the relation between the two and that strategic interests have a 
tendency of compromising the consistency of the EU’s normative basis. Even if the EU was 
talking with a single voice, it would have the same strategic weaknesses in relation to Russia 
because of its overall energy dependency. But the possibility of changing the asymmetry in 
negotiations makes these specific strategic interests easier to control by the EU through 
decreased leverage over Russia. Consequently it might enable the EU to uphold certain 
standards of its normative basis in other political aspects when engaging Russia. Thus the 
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forming of the Energy Union would increase the EU’s ability to enact its normative 
capabilities and in so become more of a normative actor.   
Solidarity: the Case of Nord Stream 
The Ukraine-Russian gas disputes of 2006 and 2009 as well as the Russian invasion of 
Georgia in 2008, which was seen as a Russian demonstration of its geopolitical control of 
relevant gas pipelines and influence over transit countries (cf. Casier 2011:540), influenced 
how published opinion and policy makers perceived EU-Russia relations and moved energy 
security up the agenda (Ibid.:538-540). Benita Ferrero-Waldner, former commissioner for 
external relations verbalised that the Ukraine-Russian gas dispute in 2006 was “a wake up 
call, reminding us that energy security needs to be even higher on our political agenda” 
(Youngs 2011:44; see also Casier 2011). Energy security issues are acknowledged in 
economic as well as political matters and the term has in some way become securitized (see 
Chapter 3.1 in this project). The on-going Ukraine crisis (2014–) had a significant impact on 
the short-term considerations for the European energy security strategy (EC 2014a:4–6). The 
Energy Union seems to tie together different aspects of energy, environment and external 
policies and to move energy security up the political agenda. The perception of the Russian-
Ukraine gas disputes had elements of securitization which served not only the solidarity 
among EU member states but also strengthened Russia it its presentation as an “energy 
superpower” (Kuzemko 2013:66–7). 
 
However, different national responses to the gas disruptions of 2006 and 2009 shows clearly 
that solidarity among member states is not a given. As Russian gas imports through Ukraine 
account for approximately 15% of the total EU gas consumption, diversification not just of 
exporters but also of supply routes becomes a high priority (Beckmann 2014, 12 March). In 
this regard the Nord Stream becomes important. This pipeline allows natural gas flows under 
the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany bypassing not only the major transit countries 
Ukraine and Belarus but also the Baltic States and Poland.  
 
In the security analysis of the Nord Stream, which Robert L. Larsson wrote for the European 
Parliament, he points out that: 
“Nord Stream improves Germany’s rather than the EU’s energy security, at least 
as long as Germany’s relations to Russia are good. However, the project 
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undermines energy security for several other members, which in turn undermines 
the EU’s development towards becoming a united actor.” (Larsson 2008:4) 
One of the minor norms within the EU, as Manners conceptualises it, is social solidarity. As a 
norm within the EU’s acquis communautaire this does not only concern how the EU engages 
the outside world but should also be reflected in the internal dialogue of the Union. As 
Larsson states, the construction of the pipeline only secures German interests where it 
actually has the feature of endangering certain member states within the EU and allocates 
increased leverage to Russia over weaker states of the EU in the north. The Nord Stream 
project does not seem to be in line with the minor norm of social solidarity, which Manner 
identified for NPE. Neither does the German decision meet the expectation #2 of speaking 
with one voice in external energy affairs. The construction of the pipeline consolidates the 
fragmentation of external energy policies instead of forming a coherent one. It creates the 
picture of a community where the stronger members can act unilaterally while the security 
and position of the weaker ones is weakened. 
Including Climate and Environmental Issues into NPE 
The use of Nord Stream might result in the weaker states focussing on domestic energy 
production to secure their energy (Larsson 2008:4). This possibly entails an intensified focus 
on shale oil and coal, which would go against the EU’s proclaimed objective of promoting 
renewables and leading the fight against climate change (expectation #4). However, there are 
many different approaches on conventional, unconventional and renewable energy sources, 
of which especially shale gas is controversial due to its devastating environmental impact. 
Several member states announced moratoria on shale gas extraction (e.g. France and 
Germany) while some are already conducting drillings (Poland is leading in this respect with 
its dozens drilling wells). Moreover, Germany is getting rid of its nuclear power plants while 
Poland is investing in new coals mines. These varied national initiatives for new energy 
sources are incoherent and even seen as counterproductive, undermining each other’s 
significance (cf. Hedberg 2015; Egenhofer et al. 2014). The use of conventional energy 
sources as coal and oil as well as environmental harmful unconventional sources like shale 
gas undermine expectation #4, the promotion of renewables and leading the fight against 
climate change. This expectation does not fit exactly into the norms Manners has suggested. 
While he is referring to Sustainable Development as a minor norm in the beginning of the 
millennium, more defined climate change action has gained momentum in the EU policies. 
Much in line with how Manners argue why he has derived the norms into his depiction of the 
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normative basis of the EU, we argue that this new norm of Leading the Fight against Climate 
Change can be included due to its constant mention in the different energy policies dating 
back to the mid 90’s. Consequently the EU is deriving expectation from its normative basis 
and articulating it in the Energy Union proposal, why its normative basis becomes reinforced 
through climate considerations. All in all this empowers the NPE argument. But the Energy 
Union proposal does lack other aspects of the normative basis, which we will consider now.  
The Compromising of NPE 
The critiques surrounding NPE put emphasis to how the EU has been inconsistent in 
upholding its normative basis when strategic interest have been present in the dialogue. We 
have argued in this analysis that the Energy union proposal enables the EU in acting more 
consistently on its normative basis and this argument only became stronger as a new norm 
has emerged in the normative basis of the EU; the leading the fight against climate change. 
Furthermore the proposal speaks of heightening internal solidarity among the member states, 
which is one of the minor norms of the EU’s normative basis. However, when looking at the 
other norms represented in Manners normative basis of the EU, it becomes apparent that the 
EU does not articulate them specifically. To take a point of departure in the critiques 
mentioned in the Theory Chapter, it is not mentioned in the Energy Union proposal that the 
EU will promote democracy or uphold human rights standards in the dialogue with third 
partner countries on energy issues. This lack of consistency on values that lie at the core of 
the EU and its proclaimed objectives can be argued to decrease the legitimacy of defining the 
EU through NPE. So, although the formation of the Energy Union in some instances would 
enhance the EU’s possibility of acting consistently with its normative basis, the lack of 
articulation of objectives such as human rights and the promotion of democracy compromise 
the concept of NPE.  
Concluding  Remarks for NPE 
We have analysed above the consistency of NPE in regard to the Energy Union Package by 
referring to three issues: the case of Russia, inner EU solidarity, climate and environmental 
action, and the compromising of NPE. The EU’s dependency on imported energy undermines 
the capability of the EU to promote these values consistently with all its trading partners, as is 
apparent in the case of Russia. Currently, the NPE minor norm of social solidarity is eroded 
by member states acting competitively rather than in cooperation in energy security issues, as 
we have shown with the example of Nord Stream. If the Energy Union can achieve its goal of 
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giving the EU a unified voice in internal and external energy issues (expectation #2), the EU 
would be in a stronger position to be consistent with its normative basis, hence becoming a 
stronger Global Actor in a normative sense. We have suggested to add a new norm to the 
EU’s normative basis, namely the leading the fight against climate change (expectation #4), 
which we also found to be one of the expectations the EU set for itself in forming the Energy 
Union. This increases the uniformity of the expectations the EU has to itself and its 
normative basis, yet again reinforcing the concept of NPE. On the other hand, the lack of 
considerations of core norms within the EU such as human rights and the promotion of 
democracy contests the concept of NPE. Drawing a conclusion, our analysis points that the 
Energy Union proposal both enhances possibilities for the EU to act in accordance with its 
normative basis but at the same time it does not regard the core norms of the Union. This 
means that the EU’s normative Global Actorness is not necessarily increased per se, instead 
some aspects of it are enhanced while others are neglected. 
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6. Conclusion 
This project was aimed to answer the following research question:  How is the Energy Union 
transforming the EU as a Global Actor? In order to answer the question in a satisfactory 
manner we set five working questions to guide our work. These were set as follows: 
 
1. What constitutes a global actor? 
2. How does the EU definition of energy security and developments in energy policies 
reflect different traits of Global Actorness? 
3. What kind of expectations does the Energy Union proposal set for the EU? 
4. How would fulfilling these expectations impact the EU as a Global Actor? 
5. Would the Energy Union increase the power of the EU? If this is the case, what kind 
of power? 
 
In the Theory Chapter we presented three theoretical strands that explain what constitutes a 
Global Actor and how they interpret the global role of the EU. As a crude simplification we 
can differentiate the strands in their focus on different kinds of power: neorealist reading 
focuses on military and to a lesser extent on economic power, which we named Great Power 
Europe, Civilian Power focuses on economic and diplomatic power and Normative Power 
deems power as influencing what is seen as normal. Moreover, we discussed energy security 
and its connections to the wider notion of national security.  
 
Our Analysis points out the EU’s definition of energy security and how its energy policies 
have developed over the years. We came to the conclusion that the EU’s definition of energy 
security is purely economic but it does not always re flect its or its member states’ energy 
policies in reality. Following that we introduced the newest developments on the EU energy 
policies, namely the Energy Union proposal from 2015, to the reader. Setting the new 
proposal in relation to preceding EU policies we identified four expectations regarding 
energy policies for the EU: #1 Completion of internal energy market, #2 Speaking with a 
single voice in external energy affairs, #3 Decreasing the dependency on energy imports and 
#4 Promoting renewables and leading the fight against climate change. The latter part of the 
analysis focused on the interconnectedness of these expectations and the different readings of 
the EU as a Global Actor. Table 3 gives an overview of our findings: 
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Expectations GPE CPE NPE 
#1 Internal energy 
market 
Supplementary for 
#2 and #3 
Improves economic power 
Potentially increases internal 
solidarity 
#2 Single voice in 
external energy 
affairs 
Most important, 
increases 
coherence 
Improves diplomatic power 
More consistency with its 
normative basis externally 
#3 Decreasing the 
dependency on 
energy imports 
Increases the EU’s 
structural power 
Improves economic power 
and adds diplomatic 
leverage but undermines 
multilateralism 
Takes the EU to a stronger 
position to project its values 
but the means to achieve that 
can undermine some EU 
norms 
#4 Leading the 
fight against 
climate change 
- 
Jeopardises economic 
power in short term, but 
can increase it in the future 
Has become a new norm and 
thus an act on its normative 
basis 
Table 3 Summary of Findings 
 
Great Power reading fails to see the EU as a full-blown Global Actor, since it does not 
resemble a coherent unit in formulating and implementing external energy policies enough. 
According to this reading, only the aspects tha t enhance the EU’s development to a state- like 
entity would work towards increasing the EU’s Global Actorness. Thus only meeting 
expectations #2 and #3 is central in this reading, and #1 is noted since it can help in creating a 
unified external voice. So in a neorealist perspective the Energy Union can push the EU to 
move in the direction of becoming a coherent actor, and thus an actor of increased relevance 
in global politics. However, the Energy Union does not meet the main weakness neo-realists 
point to, which is the EU’s lack of military capabilities and connection of energy security to 
the broader notion of traditional security.  
 
At a first glance the Energy Union proposal has only added benefits to Civilian Power 
Europe: the focus on the economic, market based solutions to the energy security problem 
consolidates the EU’s economic power. Even more importantly, a unified external voice 
would transfer this power to a considerable leverage in global politics. However, meeting 
expectation #4 may compromise economic power in the short term due to immense needs of 
investments and research into renewables. The finite nature of worldwide fossil fuel reserves, 
though, may turn a short-term drawback into a long term advantage. 
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In contrast to GPE and CPE readings, Normative Power Europe is not concerned with the EU 
not being a state-like actor. Hence the EU does not have to go through institutional changes 
in order to become a Global Actor: rather it needs to project its norms externally as well as 
internally. The formation of the Energy Union would enhance the EU’s ability to act in 
accordance with its normative basis when faced with strategic interests in terms of energy 
security, thus empowering the concept of NPE. At the same time core values within its 
normative basis such as human rights and the promotion of democracy are not mentioned in 
the Energy Union proposal, why the Union at the same time neglects fundamental values and 
its normative identity. Altogether the Energy Union proposal both enhances normative  power 
capabilities and dissociates the EU from the concept of NPE. So it becomes very hard to 
make a final statement to whether the EU is becoming more or less of an actor within NPE.  
 
Referring to our research question, we conclude that the Energy Union proposal transforms 
the European Union as a Global Actor in the following way: achieving the expectations set in 
the proposal would increase the EU’s Global Actorness in all three readings. However, the 
means to achieve this positive transformation can undermine certain aspects of both CPE and 
NPE. As of GPE, the means do not matter as long as the end result is a coherent state- like 
entity. The Energy Union does not provide this by itself but it is a step in that direction. 
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7. Further Research 
Working on this project gave rise to some issues and interrelations that we deem relevant for 
further scientific consideration. For instance the increasing importance the EU attaches to 
fighting climate change and environmental devastation is inextricable interlinked with energy 
policies. We briefly mentioned that the growing emphasis on the matter is not adequately 
reflected in the normative basis of the NPE notion developed by Manners. The EU, though, 
has exercised its competence in climate change issues at length s ince Manners first proposed 
the concept in 2001 (Manners 2001). The EU’s climate policy is of special interest because 
the upcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference to be held in 2015 is aimed on 
achieving a legally binding and universal agreement on climate. Further investigation on how 
fighting climate change has become an integral component of the NPE’s normative basis is 
therefore highly recommended.  
 
Furthermore, since the Energy Union proposal was published very recently in February 2015, 
this project focused mainly on the immediate perception on the European level. We only 
focused on academia, think tanks and public media but there is a vast array of stakeholders 
who are concerned by the proposal. Therefore, a comprehensive comparative study on the 
responses of the member states to the Energy Union proposal could shed light on how the 
member states are willing to accept further integration and thus enhance the EU’s role in 
global politics. Moreover, the Energy Union does not only affect politics and governments 
but also industry which makes a case study on how energy trading and producing companies 
are lobbying their interests a promising undertaking.  
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